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ABSTRACT 
  
 President Barack Obama committed hundreds of millions of dollars to the Teacher 
Incentive Fund (TIF), yet a few fundamental questions remain unanswered—was the 
federal program effective? Did student test scores improve? Since the late 19
th
 century, 
teachers have been paid for their classroom services regardless of how well—or poorly—
their students performed. Nearly a century later, advocates of education reform continue 
to champion teacher compensation policies that link salary to student achievement. 
Researchers have identified two motivation theories that must be present in order to have 
a successful incentive pay program: goal theory and expectancy theory. The presence or 
absence of these theories, have produced mixed results at both the federal and state 
levels. Although the Florida Department of Education crafted its own statewide incentive 
pay plan, three public school districts have received multimillion dollar awards via 
competitive TIF grants.  
 The purpose of this dissertation was to determine if any differences in learning 
gains existed between the 2008 and 2009 Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test
® 
(FCAT
®
) Math scores among the students of math teachers at one urban Central Florida 
Title I middle school who participated in TIF when compared to the students of math 
teachers who did not participate in TIF. The dissertation also analyzed FCAT
®
 Math 
scores from 2005 through 2009 in one Central Florida school district to determine if any 
trends existed among the Title I middle schools participating in TIF; if any trends existed 
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among the Title I middle schools that did not participate in TIF; and if any trends existed 
between the two groups when compared to each other. 
 The literature review and results of this study found that learning gains existed 
among students whose teachers participated in TIF. In fact, at one urban Central Florida 
middle school, students of math teachers who did not participate in TIF also 
demonstrated learning gains. In addition, seven of the ten Title I middle schools from the 
same Central Florida district had increased FCAT
®
 Math scores with the implementation 
of the TIF grant along with the three Title I middle school that were not eligible to 
participate. 
 This research suggested that the teacher incentive program implemented in a 
Central Florida district had a positive impact on learning gains of low-performing 
students.  The results of the independent-samples tests revealed that there was no 
statistical difference in the math scores based on participation in TIF.  Students of the 
math teachers who participated in TIF demonstrated at least one year‘s academic growth. 
Likewise, the findings were similar for students of teachers who opted not to participate 
as learning gains increased in this group as well.  As a result of these findings, 
recommendations for further study include end-of-the-year interviews with TIF-eligible 
teachers whose students had learning gains, but chose not to participate. Suggestions for 
additional research include surveying teachers whose students had higher scores in the 
absence of an incentive program, analyzing the test scores of other subject areas, and 
researching other school districts in Florida that were awarded the TIF grant.  
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      schools (U. S. Department of Education, 2009b). 
 
TIF Fund Grantee   Local education agencies that are recipients of the 
      Teacher Incentive Fund (U.S. Department of  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
  
 For over a hundred years, public school teachers have been paid according to the 
educational services they provided for their students. Since the latter half of the 20
th
 
century, teacher salaries have been adjusted to compensate them for their years of service 
and level of education achieved (Clardy, 1988; Goldhaber, 2009; Springer, 2009). 
Education leaders and policymakers of the new millennia were advancing the teacher 
salary reform continuum by authorizing performance pay policies that rewarded teachers 
in low-performing schools for improving their students‘ standardized test scores (Neal, 
2009; Springer). The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) was a federally funded performance 
pay program intended to close the achievement gap between low-performing students and 
their higher achieving counterparts (U.S. Department of Education, 2009b). 
 There have been relatively few comprehensive studies conducted on the various 
schools receiving TIF, yet hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars have been committed 
to the newest wave of teacher compensation reform (Obama, 2009a, Springer, 2009). In 
this dissertation, Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test
®
 (FCAT
®
) Math scores from 
urban Title I middle schools in a Central Florida district that participated in the federal 
program were analyzed. These results provided insight into the effectiveness of incentive 
programs that rewarded classroom teachers for increasing academic achievement.   
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Background 
 Recruiting and retaining highly qualified teachers has long been a challenge for 
many school administrators. Nowhere has the situation been felt more acutely than in the 
classrooms of urban schools as federal and state legislative mandates penalize districts for 
failing to raise the academic performance of low-performing students (Neal, 2009). In an 
attempt to fill this critical need for highly effective educators, policymakers have 
supported implementing incentive pay programs aimed at improving quality through 
offering cash bonuses to teachers who have increased student standardized test scores 
(Lavy, 2007; McNeil, 2007; Neal; Obama, 2009a; Springer, 2009). 
 On the evening of February, 24
th
, 2009, President Barack Obama delivered a 
speech to a joint session of the U.S. Congress that revealed the objectives of his 
unprecedented economic stimulus package, the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 (ARRA). During his oratory, he made a promise to America‘s children that 
―the goal of this administration [was] to ensure that every child [had] access to a 
complete and competitive education—from the day they are born to the day they begin a 
career‖ (Obama, 2009a, p. 5). In an effort to achieve this goal, the ARRA allocated new 
incentives for teacher performance, pathways for advancement, and rewards for academic 
success. The President‘s economic plan included increased funding for ―innovative 
programs that [were] already helping schools meet high standards and close achievement 
gaps‖ (Obama, 2009a, p. 5). The innovative program that Mr. Obama referred to in his 
speech was called the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF). The purpose of TIF, a five-year 
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competitive grant initiative, was to support performance-based programs that improved 
academic achievement among low-performing students in high-needs schools (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2009b).  
 There were several terms that were commonly used among educators and 
policymakers when describing the rewarding of superior teacher performance with 
financial compensation. Merit pay, performance pay, pay-for-performance, and incentive 
pay programs were just a few of the terms that were synonymous to initiatives in which 
student standardized test results were used to assess teacher effectiveness in the 
classroom (Goldhaber, 2009; Heneman, 1992; Lavy, 2007; McNeil, 2007; Miller & Say, 
1982; Ryan, 2009; Springer, 2009). Regardless of what the compensation system was 
called, linking a teacher‘s pay to his/her students‘ performance was a type of education 
reform designed to recruit and to retain quality teachers, while at the same time 
increasing academic outcomes among low-performing minority students, preferably in 
high-needs schools (Lavy; Miller & Say; Obama, 2009a; Ryan; U.S. Department of 
Education, 2009b). 
 For most incentive pay programs, a teacher‘s effectiveness in the classroom was 
measured through the standardized test results of his/her students. The TIF grant used the 
Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test
®
 (FCAT
®
) to determine whether or not 
participating teachers received bonuses based on their students‘ learning gains (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2007). The FCAT
®
 Sunshine State Standards (SSS) Reading 
and Mathematics were the standardized tests administered every year to Florida public 
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school children in grades three through ten. The quantitative results were reported by 
scale score and by Developmental Scale Score (DSS). Scale scores were used to 
determine a student‘s achievement level for each grade and subject tested. The DSS score 
was established to follow a child‘s academic progress over time and across grade levels 
(Florida Department of Education, 2009a). Table 1 and Table 2 illustrate the FCAT
® 
DSS 
and scale scores, respectively, used in middle schools for grades six through eight. 
 
Table 1 
FCAT
®
 Mathematics Developmental Scale Scores (DSS) 
 
Grade Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 
6 770 - 1553 1554 - 1691 1692 - 1859 1860 - 2018 2019 - 2492 
7 958 - 1660 1661 - 1785 1786 - 1938 1939 - 2079 2080 - 2572 
8 1025 - 1732 1733 - 1850 1851 - 1997 1998 - 2091 2092 - 2605 
Note. From Florida Department of Education, 2008.  
 
Table 2 
FCAT
®
 Mathematics Scale Scores 
 
Grade Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 
6 100 - 282 283 - 314 315 - 353 354 - 390 391 - 500 
7 100 - 274 275 - 305 306 - 343 344 - 378 379 - 500 
8 100 - 279 280 - 309 310 - 346 347 - 370 371 - 500 
Note. From Florida Department of Education, 2008.  
 
 For example, a low-performing seventh grade student who scored at an FCAT
® 
Level 2 for two years in a row, yet showed an increase in DSS scores (e.g. 85 points) 
during the same period of time would have demonstrated that an annual learning gain had 
  
5 
 
occurred. A learning gain had occurred when a low-performing FCAT
® 
Level 1 or 2 
student had met or exceeded a designated threshold of academic mastery based on his/her 
DSS score from one year to the next (Florida Department of Education, 2008). A higher 
performing student who had consistently scored at FCAT
® 
Level 3, 4, or 5 on consecutive 
tests also was considered to have achieved a learning gain (see Appendix A). The annual 
learning gains of low-performing students and higher performing students were measured 
using different methods. A teacher was described as highly effective when learning gains 
were made among the majority of his/her students. This study compared any differences 
between the 2008 and 2009 FCAT
®
 Math DSS scores of students in grades six through 
eight at an urban Title I middle school to determine if any learning gains occurred based 
on criteria set by the state of Florida (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
One Year‘s Growth Definition (Learning Gains) for FCAT® Math DSS 
 
Grade 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
DSS 164 119 95 78 64 54 48 
Note.  Retained students cannot demonstrate learning gains using DSS. From Florida Department of 
Education, 2007b. 
 
Statement of the Problem 
 Performance pay programs addressed two critical problems in the public education 
system: attracting and retaining highly-qualified teachers and improving academic 
outcomes among low-performing students. The passing of the No Child Left Behind Act 
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of 2001 (NCLB), had underscored America‘s need for highly effective teachers, 
especially in high-minority, low-income, high-needs urban schools (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2009a). The Obama Administration‘s Race to the Top education grant 
initiatives provided funding for areas of school reform that emphasized recruiting, 
retaining, and rewarding effective teachers and principals (U.S. Department of Education, 
2010). Consequently, there was growing concern among education policymakers about 
the declining quality of teachers. The decades of improvement in overall job 
opportunities had led to a reduction in the pool of qualified applicants for teaching 
positions (Springer, 2009). During the same period, depreciating teacher pay scales had 
channeled the best educators into more lucrative occupations (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 
2002; Springer, 2009). In an effort to counteract this alarming trend, stakeholders and 
policymakers hoped to design effective incentives that would attract, retain, and motivate 
highly-qualified and effective teachers (Neal, 2009; Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002; 
Springer).  
 ―The future belongs to the nation that best educates its citizens‖ (Obama, 2009b, p. 
2). President Obama spoke these words to the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, 
where he acknowledged that ―a stubborn [education] gap persists between how well 
white students are doing compared to their African-American and Latino classmates‖ 
(Obama, 2009b, p. 2). Quality education was widely recognized as one of the most 
important vehicles to overcome the devastating effects of economic disparities and social 
inequalities. A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Education Reform, a study by the 
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National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983) found that students who 
attended schools in underprivileged neighborhoods often lacked access to a quality 
education, which in turn, reduced their chances to acquire the academic skills needed to 
break the cycle of poverty and hopelessness. While the classroom talent and pedagogic 
knowledge of highly qualified instructors was desperately needed across the education 
spectrum, nowhere was that need more amplified than in the high-needs schools that 
served poor minority inner-city children (National Commission on Excellence in 
Education; Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002; Ryan, 2009; Springer, 2009).  
Purpose of Study 
 The purpose of this dissertation was to determine if any differences in learning 
gains existed between the 2008 and 2009 Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test
® 
(FCAT
®
) Math scores among the students of math teachers at one urban Central Florida 
Title I middle school who participated in TIF when compared to the students of math 
teachers at the same Title I middle school who did not participate. The dissertation also 
analyzed FCAT
®
 Math scores from 2005 through 2009 in one Central Florida school 
district to determine if any trends existed among the Title I middle schools participating 
in TIF; if any trends existed among the Title I middle schools that did not participate; and 
if any trends existed between the two groups when compared to each other. 
 The significance of this study was to provide insight into the efficacy of teacher 
performance pay programs, particularly those sustained with large infusions of federal 
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and state taxpayer funds. The conclusions of this study were based on actual student 
scores and school-level data, collected in a manner similar to the aggregate school-level 
data used in other research (Springer, Ballou, & Peng, 2008). These findings will 
contribute to the body of literature on education policies and teacher salary reform 
studies. 
 As we moved into the 21
st
 century, our education system was in need of successful 
salary reform programs that encouraged talented individuals to enter the teaching 
profession and to make the long-term commitment of educating America‘s 
underprivileged children in urban schools (Neal, 2009; Ryan, 2009; Springer, 2009). 
President Obama was an advocate for teacher incentive programs by allocating hundreds 
of millions of taxpayer dollars (Obama, 2009a; U.S. Department of Education, 2010). 
Governor Crist voiced his political support for merit pay plans that would ultimately 
benefit Florida‘s school children (Florida Department of Education, 2007a). However, 
critics of these types of education and salary reform measures pointed to a lack of follow-
up research to determine the effectiveness of the policies, especially as political leaders 
pledged continued financial support (Springer).  
Research Questions 
 To solidify his commitment to education reform, President Obama‘s economic 
stimulus policy, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), 
earmarked over $687 million taxpayer dollars in funding for performance pay initiatives 
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(Chait & Miller, 2009a, 2009b). Moreover, the $4.35 billion Race to the Top fund 
provided competitive federal grants that championed school reform policies (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2010). Race to the Top awarded comprehensive state education 
programs that were implementing innovative initiatives that focused on recruiting and 
rewarding effective teachers and administrators in high-needs schools that increased 
academic achievement. The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) grant, initiated under the 
George W. Bush Administration with continued support of the Obama Administration, 
was designed to improve academic achievement among low-performing students (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2009b, 2010). Therefore, the four research questions of this 
study focused on the standardized test results of academically struggling students in a 
Central Florida school district that was in the second year of a TIF grant:  
1. What differences in learning gains existed, if any, between the 2008 and 2009 
Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test
® 
Math scores among the students of 
math teachers at one urban Central Florida Title I middle school who 
participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund when compared to the students of 
math teachers who did not participate? 
2. What trends in the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test® Math scores 
from 2005 through 2009 existed, if any, among the Title I middle schools in 
one Central Florida school district that participated in the Teacher Incentive 
Fund? 
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3. What trends in the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test® Math scores 
from 2005 through 2009 existed, if any, among the Title I middle schools in 
one Central Florida school district that did not participate in the Teacher 
Incentive Fund? 
4. What trends in the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test® Math scores 
from 2005 through 2009 existed, if any, between the two groups when 
compared to each other?   
Delimitations/Assumptions 
 The writing style of this dissertation was based on the Publication Manual of the 
American Psychological Association, Sixth Edition (American Psychological 
Association, 2010). Furthermore, the data gathered for this study came from two sources: 
the 2008 and 2009 FCAT
®
 Math student scores were collected from one TIF Title I 
middle school in a Central Florida district and the 2005 through 2009 FCAT
®
 Math 
middle school scores, also from a Central Florida district, were retrieved from the Florida 
Department of Education‘s publicly accessible website.  
 Four subject areas were tested on the FCAT
®
 exams: reading, math, writing, and 
science. There were two reasons that FCAT
®
 Math scores were chosen for this study. 
First, math was tested every year in middle school from sixth through eighth grade, 
unlike writing and science, in which each were tested only once in middle school during 
eighth grade. Learning gains must be measured using consecutive annual scores. Second, 
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a student‘s math score was influenced by only one teacher, unlike a student‘s reading 
score which could be attributed to as many as three different content-area teachers—
Language Arts, Reading, and English Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL).  
 Although there were ten secondary schools participating in TIF in this Central 
Florida district, the data, findings, and conclusions in this study were limited to the seven 
participating Title I middle schools. The relationships, if any, of the scores at the 
participating Title I high schools were beyond the scope of this study. In addition, the 
data from these seven schools were compared to the three Title I middle schools that did 
not qualify for the TIF program. For the program in the Central Florida school district, 
eligibility to participate in TIF was based on the feeder patterns of its three Title I high 
schools (Orange County Public Schools, 2009e). Of the ten Title I middle schools in the 
district, only seven of them were zoned to send the majority of its students to the three 
Title I high schools. These seven Title I middle schools eligible to participate in the TIF 
were the primary focus of this study. 
 A preliminary investigation revealed that the majority of the math teachers at the 
Central Florida middle school in this study participated in the first year of the TIF grant 
during the 2007 – 2008 school year. Also, according to the information in the report from 
the first year of the TIF grant, over half of the nearly 1000 teachers and administrators at 
the TIF schools in Orange County (FL) participated (U.S. Department of Education, 
2007). Moreover, results of the end-of-year teacher surveys in the same report indicated 
continued support and participation by the respondents. Consequently, the conclusions of 
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this study were based on the assumption that the majority of instructional and 
administrative staff continued to participate during the second year of the TIF grant.  
Chapter Summary 
 Policymakers on education reform legislated hundreds of millions of taxpayer 
dollars for teacher incentive programs, even though there was limited research 
documenting their effectiveness.  This dissertation will assess the impact of the Teacher 
Incentive Fund on low-performing students at an urban Title I middle school located in 
Central Florida during the second year of its implementation. In addition, FCAT
®
 Math 
scores will be analyzed from ten Title I middle schools in the same school district over a 
period of five years. The results of these data will expose any trends in student outcomes 
that may have been influenced by the implementation of teacher performance pay 
initiatives. 
 This dissertation is made up of five chapters. Chapter One introduced the 
background and statement of the problem, the purpose of the study, and the four research 
questions. Other components of this chapter included the significance of the study as well 
as a section on delimitations and assumptions. Chapter Two provided a brief overview of 
the evolution of the teacher pay system in the United States from the end of the 20
th
 
century to the present followed by a review of the theories of motivation associated with 
performance pay programs. Teacher attitudes toward performance pay programs were 
surveyed and international perspectives from four countries were reviewed. Florida‘s 
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previous and current experiences with performance pay plans were explored, including a 
Teacher Incentive Fund that was awarded to three Florida school districts. The chapter 
ended with the results of Orange County Public School‘s first year in the Teacher 
Incentive Fund. Chapter Three described the research design and methodology of the 
study. Details of the research design, data gathering and sampling procedures, 
instrumentation, and research questions were given along with a discussion of the 
statistical analysis procedures and ethical considerations of the collected data. Chapter 
Four presented the detailed findings of the research. In Chapter Five, the conclusions 
reached in this dissertation supported the findings of previous studies on the efficacy of 
teacher performance pay programs. At the end of the chapter are recommendations for 
further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
 Teacher pay structures have transformed into several systems of compensation 
since the era of the one room schoolhouses that dotted the landscape of rural America. 
From providing room and board supplements during the late 19
th
 century to the single 
salary schedule used today, education leaders have sought to design a pay scale for 
teachers that recognized their efforts in the classroom and encouraged others to enter the 
profession. The 1983 federal report, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative For Education 
Reform, concluded that teachers who demonstrated superior pedagogic skills and 
knowledge should receive bonuses. By the early 21
st
 century, a merit-based compensation 
policy had been drafted and adopted by federal legislators—the Teacher Incentive Fund 
(TIF).  A primary goal of this performance pay program was to reward teachers who 
increased academic achievement among their low-performing students. Supporters of 
these initiatives hoped that offering financial bonuses would attract and retain high-
quality effective educators and close the achievement gap.  
 In this chapter, six topics will be discussed: evolution of the teacher pay system, an 
overview of teacher performance pay programs, the Teacher Incentive Fund, Florida‘s 
experience with performance pay programs, Florida TIF grantees, and Orange County 
(FL) Public School‘s survey results after its first year of implementing TIF. 
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Evolution of Teacher Pay System 
 The teacher pay system has evolved over the past hundred years from the modest 
wages of the pre-Industrial Age to the modern structure of educators receiving salaries 
based on education level and classroom experience (Goldhaber, 2009; Springer, 2009). 
Since the late 19
th
 century, there have been three major types of teacher pay systems: 
supplying educators with room and board to supplement salary; differentiated salary, a 
grade-based payment scale; and the single salary schedule in use today (Goldhaber; 
Podgursky, 2009; Protsik, 1995; Springer). 
Room and Board Supplement 
 In the late 1800s, the utilitarian one-room school house was a common educational 
fixture across rural America. These schools were specifically designed to serve the 
agricultural communities that dotted the American countryside (Clardy, 1988; Springer, 
2009). However, teachers in rural schoolhouses generally lacked professional training or 
certification, in fact, the extent of their own pedagogic capacity rarely extended beyond 
elementary education (Spring, 1994). An individual could secure a teaching position if 
s/he possessed a basic understanding of reading, writing, and arithmetic skills; was 
determined to exhibit high moral character; and personified middle-class values (Tyack 
& Strober, 1981). 
  During this time, teaching was considered neither a career nor a profession. Protsik 
(1995) found that women, who overwhelmingly made up the pool of schoolteachers, 
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were prohibited from working in the classroom after marriage, while the small cadre of 
men who entered the field, generally did so as an income supplement to their primary 
responsibility—farming. When taken together, local education officials found little 
incentive to invest significant amounts of financial resources into the salaries of teachers. 
As a matter of practice, teachers were given room and board by their students‘ parents in 
an effort to supplement the meager salaries (Protsik).  
 Spring (1994) revealed that providing room and board for its schoolteachers had 
distinct advantages for the community. For instance, the lifestyle of the teacher was under 
constant supervision by the hosting family. Because most educators lacked professional 
training, the housing arrangements provided a type of accountability to the townspeople. 
Unfortunately, the public scrutiny into their private lives on top of the low wages 
discouraged women and men from committing to long-term teaching jobs (Spring).  
Differentiated Salary 
 Protsik (1995) and Springer (2009) noted in their research that by the early 1900s, 
American society migrated from sprawling rural farms to incommodious urban centers. 
Additionally, the economic demands of the Industrial Revolution mandated changes to 
the nation‘s schools (Protsik; Springer). As the populace shifted to urban centers, 
specialized employment skills needed in city factories required school leaders to design a 
more sophisticated curriculum. Tyack‘s (1974) study explained how the one-room 
schoolhouse gave way to graded schools—placing students by age and ability into 
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separate classrooms with appropriate levels of rigor. Springer (2009) expanded on 
Tyack‘s findings as Springer noted that teachers were paid according to the grade level of 
their students. In response to these pedagogic and curricular changes, education reformers 
decided that teachers needed professional training; they were required to become certified 
by either graduating from teaching colleges or institutions or passing a county 
examination (Tyack, 1974). 
 With the establishment of graded schools and teacher certification requirements, 
came a redesign of salary structures. Although many states adhered to a minimum salary 
level, individual cities commonly created differentiated salary schedules based on a 
teacher‘s years of experience, gender, race, and the grade level taught (Podgursky, 2009; 
Tyack & Strober, 1981). Both systems—minimum salary level and differentiated salary 
schedule—were created with the goal of reducing high teacher turnover due to low 
salaries and to encourage others to enter the profession. According to Rothman (1978), 
the average urban teacher remained in the field of education for nearly a decade as a 
result of the differentiated pay schedule.  
 The overtly sexist (men were paid more than women) and racist (whites were paid 
more than blacks) salary allocation practices within the system led to the eventual demise 
of the differentiated pay scale. The notion of ―equal pay for equal work‖ ushered in the 
salary system that was prevalent in most school districts across the country (Goldhaber, 
2009; Podgursky, 2009; Protsik, 1995). All classroom instructors were paid at the same 
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scale regardless of race, gender, or grade level taught giving rise to the name—single 
salary schedule (Educational Research Service, 1978).  
Single Salary Schedule 
 The single salary schedule was a table in which an instructor‘s educational status 
and years of teaching experience dictated the amount of his/her annual compensation 
(Clardy, 1988; Goldhaber, 2009; Podgursky, 2009). In Table 4, an example of the single 
salary schedule that was used in Duval County (FL) Public Schools illustrated how each 
column represented a teacher‘s level of education, such as bachelor‘s degree or master‘s 
degree, while the rows designated the number of years of teaching experience. To 
determine an individual‘s annual salary, the teacher would locate the cell created by the 
intersection of the appropriate educational level and years of experience (Clardy; 
Podgursky). Table 5 illustrates an example of a variation to the single salary table that 
was used in Miami-Dade County (FL) Public Schools that included a supplement for 
advanced degrees in addition to one‘s regular compensation. 
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Table 4 
2009 – 2010 Single Salary Schedule: Duval County (FL) Public Schools 
 
 
 
Year Bachelor‘s Master‘s Specialist Doctor‘s   
1 37,300 38,300 39,300 40,300   
2 37,439 38,449 39,748 41,161   
3 37,629 38,643 40,105 41,539   
4 37,902 39,074 40,518 41,972   
5 38,284 39,541 40,946 42,419   
6 38,693 40,085 41,319 42,793   
7 39,078 40,455 41,730 43,177   
8 39,505 40,771 42,214 43,663   
9 40,196 41,358 42,804 44,288   
10 40,721 41,972 43,446 44,876   
11 41,260 42,598 44,042 45,974   
12 41,958 43,300 44,865 46,919   
13 42,961 44,115 45,618 47,919   
14 43,540 44,744 47,058 48,858   
15 44,117 45,349 48,132 49,584   
16 44,983 46,316 48,991 50,436   
17 45,831 46,941 49,659 51,111   
18 46,486 47,459 50,156 51,511   
19 48,290 50,454 52,415 53,746   
20 50,648 53,617 55,101 56,926   
21 53,437 56,584 58,160 60,093   
22 55,515 58,537 59,991 62,047   
23 57,052 59,996 61,342 63,354   
95 65,301 68,449 69,888 71,891   
Note. From Duval County Public Schools, 2010. 
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Table 5 
2009 – 2010 Salary Schedule: Miami-Dade County (FL) Public Schools 
 
Year Bachelor's    
1 38,000    
2 38,190    
3 38,381    
4 38,573    
5 38,766    
6 38,960    
7 39,154    
8 39,350    
9 39,547    
10 39,745    
11 39,943    
12 40,143    
13 41,400    
 *******    
15 47,000    
 *******    
17 50,300    
 *******    
19 53,100    
20 54,350    
21 58,350    
22 68,225    
 
 
Supplement for 
Advanced Degrees 
Master's 3,100 
Specialist 5,150 
Doctorate 7,200 
 Note. From Miami-Dade County Public Schools, 2010. 
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 Modest pay increases occurred annually after the completion of another 
consecutive year of service, following an expected advance up the ―steps‖ within each 
educational level (Clardy, 1988). Podgursky (2009) recognized that there were two types 
of performance behaviors that these salary structures identify as important: longevity and 
continued education. Financial incentives came from continued employment within the 
school district and from acquiring additional advanced college degrees (Clardy; 
Goldhaber, 2009; Podgursky). These pay structures provided no recognition of how 
effectively a teacher performed in the classroom. An increase in salary would occur every 
year regardless of instructional skills or student achievement (Goldhaber). 
 The single salary structure was a ―nearly universal feature‖ of the majority of 
school districts across America. Podgursky (2009) noted in his research that 96 percent of 
public school districts reported using some type of salary schedule. The premise of this 
popular salary plan was that instructional and pedagogic knowledge ―improve[d] with 
each year spent in the classroom and with each additional hour of college completed‖ 
(Clardy, 1988, p. 15). Ironically, there was a lack empirical evidence to support a 
correlation between continued education and better teaching (Ferris & Winkler, 1986; 
Greenwald, Hedges, & Laine, 1996; Hanushek, 1989; Podgursky; Springer, 2009).  
 The single salary schedule addressed the inequities of the differentiated pay scale. 
Protsik (1995) discovered that teachers were paid for how long they were in the 
classroom and what college degree they held—arguably equitable and objective 
characteristics. On the other hand, education reformers pointed out that the single salary 
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schedule ―treats teachers with the same education level and experience as equals, despite 
unequal performance and skills‖ (Protsik, p. 12). Furthermore, an unintended 
consequence of the single salary system that impacted low-performing students was that 
teachers with less classroom experience within a school district received the lowest pay 
and were most often assigned to the high-needs schools (Podgursky, 2009; Ryan, 2009). 
Teacher Salary Reform 
 A major reason teachers cited for entering the profession was the satisfaction of 
working with children (Goodlad, 1984). On the other hand, these same teachers noted the 
low salaries as a major reason for leaving. In their opinion, the meager compensation sent 
a message that their instructional services were undervalued. For many, the intention to 
become long-term educators evaporated upon experiencing tedious, non-student related, 
day-to-day activities with less than rewarding salaries. Ferris and Winkler (1986) 
discovered that attracting highly qualified individuals into teaching required raising 
beginning salaries. In addition, increasing the average annual pay would reduce mass 
exodus. Spuck (1974) also noted that offering extrinsic rewards attracted and retained 
teachers. Using a market-based approach, Podgursky (2009) concluded that teachers who 
demonstrated a high level of efficiency should receive a higher level of compensation. 
  When surveyed, teachers believed that increasing salaries would most likely attract 
and retain qualified educators (U.S. Department of Education, 2007). Their career 
decisions were based largely on future annual income; such as the decision to pursue a 
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teaching profession, the decision to stay in certain school districts (as opposed to 
relocating to another district with higher salaries), and the decision to abandon the field 
altogether (Bobbitt, 1989). Providing decent salaries would go a long way towards 
keeping teachers in the profession and reducing turnover rates (Bobbitt; Springer, 2009; 
Vigdor, 2009). 
 In 1983, the groundbreaking federal report, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative For 
Educational Reform, strongly recommended a teacher compensation scheme that was 
―professionally competitive, market-sensitive, and performance-based‖ (National 
Commission on Excellence in Education, p. 26). According to the report, salary reform 
should reward superior teachers, encourage average ones, and either improve or terminate 
ineffective educators. In response to this recommendation, education advocates and 
policy makers have supported performance pay programs that rewarded teachers who 
demonstrated a greater level of student achievement. By making salary contingent on a 
teacher‘s effectiveness, individual motivation to do an outstanding job should increase 
(Clardy, 1988; Podgursky, 2009; Springer, 2009). 
Teacher Performance Pay Programs 
 Performance pay policy options to improve teaching quality could be grouped into 
three basic categories: (a) policies that improved teacher preparation and professional 
development, (b) policies that affected who became a teacher and how long the person 
remained in the field, and (c) policies that affected the work that teachers did in the 
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classroom (Vegas, 1994). Federal TIF grants underwrite state performance pay programs 
that created financial incentives that motivated talented teachers and encouraged qualified 
individuals to enter the teaching profession. In addition, there was a TIF requirement to 
provide supplementary professional development opportunities for its participants (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2009b).  
  Increased academic standards, as mandated by local, state, and federal agencies, 
were making significant demands on teachers for increasing curriculum knowledge, 
instructional skills, job performance, and student achievements. Previous salary reform 
programs did little to emphasize continuous professional development of specific 
pedagogic skills identified by school administrators as important to improving the 
academic success of low-performing minority students (Bacharach & Conley, 1986). 
 Performance pay was used to reward teachers with bonuses for increased student 
achievement and to provide a stronger incentive for continuous professional 
improvement. Lawler (1990) discovered that a more effective long-term performance 
strategy was to award the bonus independent of a teacher‘s base salary, thereby making it 
necessary to review the teacher‘s performance each school year. 
Theories of Motivation 
There were two motivation theories whose behavioral responses were more 
closely identified with the structure of business organizations that education 
administrators and policymakers hoped would transfer to public school settings. Goal-
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setting theory and expectancy theory explained how teachers were motivated and the 
roles that incentive programs could play (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002). 
Goal-Setting Theory 
 Locke (1968) proposed the goal-setting theory to explain a psychological 
phenomenon associated with employee motivation. The general premise of the theory 
was that ―goals motivate[d] employee behavior when they [were] specific, challenging, 
and accepted as worthwhile and achievable‖ (Odden & Kelley, 1997, p. 60). Additional 
research has shown that identifying attainable and measureable goals would encourage an 
employee to reach beyond previous performance levels. (Mento, Steel, & Karren, 1987; 
Mohrman & Lawler, 1996; Podgursky, 2009; Rowan, 1996). 
 Offering incentive pay could enhance goal-setting behavior when monetary 
rewards were attached to surpassing specific measureable goals. Financial rewards 
increased an individual‘s commitment to reaching goals (Wright, 1989). Additional 
empirical evidence from Heneman (1992) underscored Wright‘s findings—challenging 
goals did not discourage participation in performance pay programs. In the aggregate, 
these results highlighted the importance of establishing goals. Employee motivation 
would be highest when attainable, measurable goals and monetary rewards were tied 
together—e.g. performance pay programs—rather than as unrelated activities (Heneman).  
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Expectancy Theory 
 Expectancy theory also could be used to predict employee behavior when designing 
an effective performance pay program (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002). According to the 
theory, individuals were more likely to participate in incentive programs when three 
conditions existed: expectancy, line of sight, and valence (Cumming, 1994; Heneman & 
Schwab, 1979; Heneman, Schwab, Fossum, & Dyer, 1989; Johnson, 1986; Lawler, 1986, 
1990; Welbourne & Mejia, 1995). The expectancy condition includes in the underlying 
beliefs of the individual as s/he perceived the characteristics of the goal. For instance, a 
participant must have believed that the goal was both attainable and within his/her 
control. One also must have believed that accomplishing the goal was realistic and that 
s/he possessed the ability and skill needed to satisfy all of the requirements to receive the 
reward  (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002).  
 Odden and Kelley (1997, 2002) identified that the next condition, line of sight, 
required participants to envision a positive correlation between their own performance 
and receiving the bonus and that the final condition of valence, participants must consider 
the incentive deserving of their time and effort. Vast amounts of empirical research have 
established that performance pay programs that included these three conditions have been 
most persuasive toward stimulating employee motivation (Blinder, 1990; Heneman, 
1992; Heneman et al., 1989; Kennedy, Fossum, & White, 1983; Lawler, 1971, 1990; 
Wanous, Keon, & Latack, 1983; Welbourne & Mejia, 1995). 
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 While goal-setting and expectancy theories helped explain an employee‘s 
psychological propensity to engage in performance pay programs, both intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivating factors contributed to behavior decisions as well. Odden & Kelley 
(1997, 2002) and Podgursky (2009) reported that strong intrinsic motivators describe 
attainable goals and allow adequate professional development opportunities whereas 
performance objectives accurately demonstrate a teacher‘s effectiveness in the classroom. 
In addition, their combined research also highlighted that extrinsic motivators should 
include appealing financial incentives, continuous administrative support, and effective 
collaboration among one‘s peers. Not surprisingly, extrinsic motivating factors could 
reinforce intrinsic ones and vice versa. The most efficacious performance pay programs 
brought together aspects of motivation theories and motivating factors (Odden & Kelley, 
1997, 2002).  
Teacher Attitudes Toward a Performance Pay Program 
 An online survey of teachers in 199 traditional public and magnet schools in 
Hillsborough County (FL) was administered at the end of the 2006 – 2007 school year; 
1691 teachers responded (Jacob & Springer, 2008). The authors of this study found mild 
support for performance pay incentives among teachers and a weak relationship between 
teachers‘ characteristics and their views on performance pay initiatives. In addition, 
―teachers who [had] a more positive view of their principal‘s leadership ability and more 
confidence in their own teaching ability‖ were more likely to support incentive programs 
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(Jacob & Springer, 2008, p. 1). Jacob and Springer chose the teachers in Hillsborough 
County for their study because education reformers in this school district had 
―successfully designed and implemented several financial incentive programs, including 
teacher recruitment and retention bonuses for working in hard-to-staff schools or subject 
areas‖ (p. 3). While it should be noted that their survey instrument did not identify a 
specific incentive program, the teachers‘ responses could provide some insight into their 
attitudes towards performance-based initiatives similar to the federal program. A year 
after this survey was conducted, Hillsborough County Public Schools, along with two 
other Florida school districts, was awarded a Teacher Incentive Fund grant for the 2007 – 
2008 school year (U.S. Department of Education, 2009c). 
 Some of the key findings of Jacob and Springer‘s (2008) study were that teachers 
favored bonuses based on individual performance rather than school or group 
performance. However, over half of the teachers were concerned that competitive 
rewards would destroy the ―collaborative culture of teaching.‖ Almost a third believed 
that implementing these programs would encourage teachers to work harder (Jacob & 
Springer). 
 Jacob and Springer (2008) discovered a weak relationship between teacher 
demographics and views on incentive pay programs. For example, gender and race were 
not correlated with supporting performance pay. Also, the number of students in the 
school (school size) nor the average achievement level of the school (school grade) were 
related to attitudes towards performance initiatives.  Yet, years of teaching experience did 
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impact their opinions. Novice teachers with one to three years of experience were more 
supportive of incentive pay than veteran teachers with more than 20 years of experience. 
Secondary school teachers heavily favored incentive pay over elementary school teachers 
(Jacob & Springer).  
 The report also noted that a teacher who viewed his/her principal as an effective 
school leader supported incentive programs. The survey defined an effective principal as 
a school leader who set high standards for teaching, allocated time for professional 
development, and provided the resources needed for quality instruction (Jacob & 
Springer, 2008). And finally, teachers who were confident in their subject-area 
knowledge and pedagogic abilities were more likely to view incentive programs as a 
positive enticement. Jacob and Springer concluded that the respondents in their survey 
expressed favorable opinions on teacher incentive programs in general. However, it 
should be noted these positive findings may not necessarily translate into active 
participation or widespread support for specific teacher incentive pay plans (e.g. the 
Teacher Incentive Fund). 
Teacher Performance Pay Programs: International Perspectives 
 Teacher salary reform was not solely an American education policy phenomenon. 
Several countries, such as India, Israel, Kenya, and Mexico, have implemented incentive 
programs that when taken collectively yielded mixed results. For example in India, 
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2008) discovered that performance pay programs 
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improved academic achievement and encouraged positive classroom behavioral changes 
among teachers. On mathematics and language tests, students whose teachers participated 
in incentive programs outperformed their counterparts who did not participate. Moreover, 
teachers who participated in the programs were found to have assigned more homework, 
offered tutoring sessions outside of class time, and focused attention on the academic 
progress of low-performing students (Muralidharan & Sundararaman).  
 The findings of Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2008) supported Lavy‘s (2002) 
research on performance pay programs in Israel. Lavy‘s report also documented 
improved instructional strategies that were attributed to the implementation of the 
program. Lavy discovered ―a positive and statistically significant‖ impact on student 
academic achievement from an incentive program designed to reduce student drop-out 
rates. A survey of teacher attitudes and behaviors revealed positive changes in teaching 
practices and effort, while adjusting their instructional strategies for low-performing 
students (Lavy). 
 Glewwe, Holla, and Kremer (2008) reported that Kenyan students of teachers who 
were eligible to receive bonuses scored better on standardized tests. Students whose 
teachers participated in performance pay programs had ―noticeably higher‖ scores on 
standardized tests than students of teachers who did not participate. Participating teachers 
were also more likely to offer test preparation sessions beyond the regular school day 
(Glewwe et al.).  
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 A comprehensive evaluation of an incentive program in Mexico conducted by 
Santibañez et al. (2007) revealed encouraging—albeit small—effects on secondary 
students. Bonuses were awarded based on the accumulation of  points on a variety of 
criteria as defined by the incentive plan, including years of experience, highest degree 
held, professional development activities, the teacher‘s performance on a subject-matter 
knowledge test, and their students‘ test scores (Santibañez et al.). The authors of this 
study noted that the program‘s extensive award criteria may have not motivated teachers 
to exert the amount of effort necessary to yield dramatic increases in student scores.      
Teacher Incentive Fund 
 The education policy recommendations in A Nation at Risk, underscored the need 
for a salary reform program that would reward superior teachers whose students achieved 
academic greatness (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983). Nearly 
twenty years later, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, required that all public school 
students, especially those who were in high-minority, high-poverty locations, were to be 
taught by highly-effective teachers (U.S. Department of Education, 2009a). With these 
goals in mind, President George W. Bush proposed in his 2006 budget a teacher 
performance pay initiative, the Teacher Incentive Fund (Chait & Miller, 2009a).  
 The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) was created to more closely align salary 
structures with quality teaching and increased student learning, while at the same time 
provided incentives to attract dedicated individuals to high-needs schools (U.S. 
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Department of Education, 2009b). When first implemented during the 2007 – 2008 
school year, TIF provided $50 million dollars in competitive grants for states to design 
incentive programs that recognized and rewarded highly-effective teachers. Over the next 
two years, TIF awarded more than 30 competitive five-year grants stimulating growth in 
various state departments of education and local school boards for teacher salary reform 
policies (see Appendix B). During that time, the increase in funding had been dramatic—
from $97 million in fiscal year 2009 to $487.3 million in fiscal year 2010 (Chait & 
Miller, 2009b). On top of that nearly five-fold endowment, the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 infused another $200 million (Chait & Miller, 2009a; Obama, 
2009a). Last, but not least, the Race to the Top fund awarded $4.35 billion in competitive 
grants for various education reform projects, including teacher incentive pay programs 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2010). 
 The Teacher Incentive Fund was a five-year federal competitive grant program that 
supported the development and implementation of performance-based teacher reward 
systems, based primarily on increased student achievement in high-needs public schools 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2009b). All local educational agencies (LEAs), e.g. 
public school districts, were eligible to apply provided the incentive program was to be 
implemented in schools with more than 30 percent of its student enrollment from low-
income families. Approved grant applications contained well-defined and attainable 
student achievement goals, opportunities for professional development training and 
support, and on-going instructional feedback from administrators—elements researchers 
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had determined to be necessary in successful incentive programs (Blinder, 1990; 
Heneman, 1992; Kennedy et al., 1983; Lawler, 1971; Neal, 2009; Odden & Kelley, 1997, 
2002; Podgursky, 2009; Springer, 2009).  
Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) 
 While there had not been an evaluation of the TIF program specifically, the 
conclusions drawn in a study of the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) by Springer et 
al. (2008) suggested promising results on the effect of teacher incentive programs in 
general. TAP, a multi-state performance pay program subsidized by TIF grants, was 
developed in 1999 by the Milken Foundation with various pedagogic goals that included 
attracting highly-qualified educators, improving teacher effectiveness, and increasing 
student achievement. By 2006, the school-wide incentive program was implemented in 
over 180 schools in 14 states and the District of Columbia. The authors of the study used 
mathematics test score data from nearly 1,200 TAP and non-TAP schools in two states 
spanning a four-year period from the 2002 – 2003 to the 2005 – 2006 school years.  
 The TAP design had four elements: (1) multiple career paths that created 
opportunities for professional advancement; (2) on-going targeted professional 
development that focused on specific instructional needs; (3) instructionally-focused 
accountability through summative and formative student assessments; and (4) 
performance-based compensation criteria with detailed student outcomes. According to 
the goal-setting and expectancy theories of motivation and the intrinsic and extrinsic 
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factors, TAP contained the conditions necessary for both successful teacher participation 
and improved student outcomes (Odden & Kelley, 1997, 2002; Springer, 2009).  
 To determine the impact of the performance pay program, Springer et al. (2008) 
compared school-level student math test score gains in schools that participated in TAP 
with school-level student math test score gains in non-TAP schools. Their results 
revealed a significant positive TAP-treatment effect on student scores in the grades two 
through six, while in the secondary schools the learning gains were only marginally 
higher. Furthermore, TAP schools had slightly higher test score gains when compared to 
the average test score gains in their respective states. It should be noted that the 
mathematics test score data used for their study were not the high-stakes exams on which 
the teacher bonuses were based (Springer et al.).  
Florida‘s Experience with Performance Pay Programs 
 The Center for Educator Reform (2007) reported that while President George W. 
Bush‘s administration explored establishing a national federal merit pay plan, the Florida 
Department of Education (FLDOE) and state legislators required that school districts use 
student learning gains and classroom performance evaluations to determine and to reward 
highly-effective teachers. As a result, then-Governor Jeb Bush authorized legislative 
mandates that ordered all public school districts to propose and to implement their own 
teacher performance pay programs by 2003. The state statutes also allowed broad 
flexibility in how districts crafted their incentive plans. However, the same report noted 
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that the absence of state funding discouraged stakeholder buy-in and precipitated a 
hodgepodge of inconsistently designed reward programs with complicated application 
requirements and convoluted award criteria. Consequently, a relatively small percentage 
of teachers were able to qualify for the performance bonuses (Center for Educator 
Compensation Reform). 
 Many districts designed restrictive bonus pay systems that required teachers to 
maneuver through a tedious application process and nearly impossible award targets. For 
example, about two-thirds of Florida‘s 67 school districts insisted that teachers submit an 
application while a separate two-thirds mandated the submission of instructional 
portfolios (Center for Educator Compensation Reform, 2007). In one district, only 
tenured teachers were eligible for the incentive program, in yet another only National 
Board Certified Teachers could apply. State education officials and policymakers were 
disappointed when only ten or fewer teachers per district received bonuses in the 2005 – 
2006 school year from just over half of Florida‘s public school districts (Office of 
Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability, 2007).  
 Taking matters into their own hands, undaunted policymakers crafted various 
mandatory statewide ―one-size-fits-all‖ performance pay programs for districts to put into 
action. By 2008, the Florida Department of Education (2007a, 2009b, 2009d, 2009f) 
reported the enactment of three different teacher incentive programs plans: Effectiveness 
Compensation (E-Comp), Special Teachers Are Rewarded (STAR), and the Merit Award 
Program (MAP). All of these salary reform policies were mandated by state statutes to 
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contain four criteria: (1) broad eligibility for all school-based instructional staff and 
administrators; (2) teacher-level compensation for individual teachers as opposed to 
school-level awards to be shared among the entire faculty; (3) the award was primarily 
based on student learning gains and to a lesser degree on teacher performance 
evaluations; and (4) the state education commissioner had the authority to ascertain 
whether district programs met the state mandates and could deny funding for those that 
failed to meet them (Center for Educator Compensation Reform, 2007; Florida 
Department of Education, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009f).  
Effectiveness Compensation (E-Comp) 
 In 2006, Effectiveness Compensation (E-Comp) was provided to LEAs by the 
FLDOE to eliminate the multitude of incentive plan models that were being executed 
among school districts and to meet the state‘s performance pay requirements (Center for 
Educator Compensation Reform, 2007; Florida Department of Education, 2009d). The 
cornerstone of this policy was that the amount of freedom given for designing the 
performance pay plans was reduced significantly at the district level, thereby ensuring a 
uniform statewide approach. There were five key provisions for E-Comp: (1) all 
instructional staff were eligible and any application requirements or additional criteria 
were prohibited; (2) the measurement of a teacher‘s performance was primarily based on 
the learning gains of his/her students via assessment tools approved by the FLDOE; (3) 
bonuses worth five percent of a teacher‘s base salary were awarded to at least ten percent 
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of teachers in each district; (4) funding was to come from the state legislature—the 
education commissioner hoped to receive about $55 million; and (5) the commissioner 
would review the compensation plans for all 67 public school districts for proper 
compliance (Center for Educator Compensation Reform; Florida Department of 
Education, 2009d).  
   Strong opposition by teachers, district leaders, and teacher unions prevented 
statewide adoption of E-Comp. Several elements of the program troubled stakeholders: 
the absence of design involvement at the local level—teachers, district leaders, and 
unions; too much reliance on the FCAT
®—a single measure of student performance; the 
proportion of teachers recognized—stakeholders felt the percentage was woefully 
inadequate; unrealistic timeline development—districts were given four months to craft a 
plan, negotiate it with their unions, and submit it for state approval (Center for Educator 
Compensation Reform, 2007).  
Special Teachers Are Rewarded (STAR) 
 On the heels of the failed E-Comp, the Florida Legislature allocated $147.5 million 
dollars for the newly created Special Teachers Are Rewarded (STAR) incentive program 
(Florida Department of Education, 2009f). After having recognized the unpopular focus 
on FCAT
®
 results in the previous performance pay plans, principal evaluations were to be 
added to measure teacher performance along with student learning gains, classroom 
management, and instructional practices. Also, the timeline for local school boards to 
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develop and meet with teachers unions was expanded. Like the E-Comp, all instructional 
personnel were eligible for a bonus and included an option for the inclusion of school 
administrators. STAR increased the proportion of teachers receiving bonuses from ten 
percent to the top 25 percent in each district—hoping to recognize a larger group of 
educators (Center for Educator Compensation Reform, 2007; Florida Department of 
Education). The amount of the performance bonus was calculated on five percent of a 
teacher‘s base salary for the 2006 – 2007 school year (Orange County Public Schools, 
2009b, 2009c). Approval of district incentive plans was made by the state board of 
education, shifting the responsibility from the education commissioner (Florida 
Department of Education). Despite these policy modifications, only two-thirds of local 
school boards agreed to participate in the program, some over the objections of their 
teachers.  
 After only one year of implementation, STAR was dismantled after the 2006 – 
2007 school year because—among other issues—it failed to garner widespread support 
across the state from teachers, unions, and superintendents. The major objection from 
stakeholders was the inconsistent payout amounts (Center for Educator Compensation 
Reform, 2007). For instance, a teacher at the lower end of the salary scale could achieve 
higher student learning gains while a more experienced counterpart at the upper end of 
the scale had students with significantly lower gains. The resulting bonus payout for the 
novice teacher would be less than that of the veteran because the award payment would 
be calculated on their respective salaries. 
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Merit Award Program (MAP) 
 The Merit Award Program (MAP) was another attempt by the Florida legislature to 
implement a statewide teacher performance pay plan. In March of 2007, Governor 
Charlie Crist signed into law a bill creating the new incentive pay program to replace 
STAR (Florida Department of Education, 2007b). Most of the provisions outlined in the 
STAR program were carried over into the MAP plan with a few significant adjustments. 
First, school districts were allowed to opt out of participating in the MAP plan provided 
local educational agencies (LEAs) were able to design and implement a performance plan 
of their own with similar goals and objectives. Second, academic proficiency, which was 
a measure of what a student learned, was included as a barometer of student achievement.  
 The previous plan mandated that student performance was to be based on learning 
gains, which required a pre-test and a corresponding posttest. For example, an end-of-
course Algebra II test would measure the degree of academic proficiency of a secondary 
math student whereas the difference in DSS scores from two consecutive years of the 
FCAT
®
 Mathematics tests would establish the amount of annual learning gains achieved 
(Florida Department of Education, 2009b, 2009c; Orange County Public Schools, 2009a). 
Finally, awards for the high performing teachers were to be based on five to ten percent 
of the district‘s average teacher‘s salary, unlike STAR where the payout was calculated 
on the individual‘s own base salary—which meant different bonus amounts depending on 
the teacher‘s length of service within the same district or even within the same school 
(Orange County Public Schools). 
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 Although 53 districts adopted the new performance pay program (Center for 
Educator Compensation Reform, 2007), Orange County Public Schools (OCPS), the 
source of this dissertation‘s data, did not participate in the 2007 – 2008 school year. 
According to a statement posted on the district‘s website in 2009, ―OCPS [was] currently 
studying the MAP legislation and its implications‖ (Orange County Public Schools, 
2009c). As of the 2009 – 2010 school year, MAP had not been implemented in any 
Orange County public school.  
 Extensive research had shown that goal theory and expectancy theory were integral 
motivational components of successful performance pay programs (Blinder, 1990; 
Heneman, 1992; Heneman et al., 1989; Kennedy et al., 1983; Lawler, 1971, 1990; 
Podgursky, 2009; Springer, 2009; Wanous, et al., 1983; Welbourne & Mejia, 1995). Yet, 
in spite of the carefully crafted performance objectives and measurable student outcomes, 
the Florida plans failed to ignite widespread teacher buy-in—a critical motivating factor. 
Staff members did not believe that they were capable of accomplishing the goals nor did 
they consider the inequitable calculation of the bonuses as worthy of their time and effort 
(Jacob & Springer, 2008). Legislators and administrators who crafted these salary reform 
policies underestimated how the absence of expectancy theory can unravel even the most 
well-intentioned initiatives.  
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Florida TIF Grantees 
 In 2007, first year of the TIF grant program, three of Florida‘s largest school 
districts were collectively awarded over $12 million: Miami-Dade County Public 
Schools, Hillsborough County Public Schools, and Orange County Public Schools (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2009c). Similar in scope and design to previous Florida salary 
reform policies (E-Comp, STAR, and MAP), the TIF grants were awarded to high-needs 
schools as determined by each district‘s criteria for eligibility of participation in the TIF 
program.   
Miami-Dade County Public Schools 
 Miami-Dade County Public Schools, located on Florida‘s southeast coast, was the 
largest school district in the state and the fourth largest school system in the nation. The 
district employed over 22,000 instructors and nearly 1,100 administrators. It served 
348,000 students where 59% qualified for free or reduced-price lunch (Florida 
Department of Education, 2009e).  
 Project RISE—Rewards and Incentives for School Educators—was the district‘s 
five-year performance pay program funded its first year with a $2.7 million TIF award. 
The program was ―designed to increase teacher and principal effectiveness in [36] high-
needs schools through incentives and support, which would result in increased student 
achievement‖ (Miami-Dade County Public Schools, 2009, p. 1). The cornerstone of this 
comprehensive pilot plan was creating a ―climate of change and high expectations 
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through learning communities, systems of mentoring, embedded professional 
development, and non-instructional planning time‖ (U.S. Department of Education, 
2009c, p. 10). Project RISE awards ranged from $2500 to $3000 for teachers and 
administrators (Center for Educator Compensation Reform, 2008). 
Hillsborough County Public Schools 
 Hillsborough County Public Schools, situated on the central west coast, was the 
third largest school district in Florida and the eighth largest school system in the nation 
(Florida Department of Education, 2009e). Almost 13,000 teachers and 650 
administrators served over 193,000 students of whom 48% qualified for free or reduced-
price lunch.  
 POWER—Performance Outcomes with Effective Rewards—was a five-year 
performance pay program for teachers and administrators that combined classroom 
performance with student achievement. POWER received an initial TIF funding award of 
$3 million that ―provide[d] differentiated compensation for teachers and administrators in 
[21] high-needs schools‖ (Hillsborough County Public Schools, 2009, p. 1; U.S. 
Department of Education, 2009c). The hallmarks of POWER established a reward system 
based on increased student learning gains and increased teacher and principal 
effectiveness by offering staff development related to skills necessary to reach their 
objectives. After the 2007 – 2008 school year, teachers and administrators received 
awards of $1096.91 each (Center for Educator Compensation Reform, 2008). 
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Orange County Public Schools 
 Orange County Public Schools, located in central Florida, was the fourth largest 
school district in the state and the tenth largest school system in the nation with over 
11,000 instructors and nearly 470 administrators. Forty-seven percent of its 174,000 
students benefited from free or reduced-price lunch (American School & University, 
2010; Florida Department of Education, 2009e).  
 Project REAP—Recognizing Excellence in Achievement and Professionalism—
was a five-year performance pay program that rewarded teachers and administrators for 
improved student achievement. Orange County‘s (FL) first year TIF award of $6.6 
million was used to implement the program in ten high-needs urban Title I secondary 
schools located across the district (U.S. Department of Education, 2009c). Project REAP 
contained three main components: targeted professional development activities, increased 
student achievement scores, and positive final evaluations (Orange County Public 
Schools, 2009e). Teachers received bonuses of up to $4000, while administrators 
received up to $5000 (Center for Educator Compensation Reform, 2008).    
 At first glance, Project REAP embraced the motivation elements necessary for a 
successful merit pay program: clearly defined student goals, staff development 
opportunities that helped teachers become more effective in the classroom, on-going 
administrative support and feedback, and an attractive financial bonus. The TAP 
program, which was based on components similar to Project REAP, revealed promising 
  
44 
 
results for incentive programs as student academic achievement improved in its 
participating schools (Springer et al., 2008).  
Teacher Incentive Fund – Year 1: 
Orange County Public Schools Summative Survey Results 
 During the 2007 – 2008 school year, the first year Orange County Public Schools 
participated in the TIF grant, 1,040 administrators and teachers located in the ten Orange 
County (FL) Title I secondary schools were eligible to participate in the performance pay 
program (U.S. Department of Education, 2007). Of that number, 507 participants 
satisfied the pay-out requirements at the end of the school year and received bonuses 
totaling $1,956,000; it should be noted that the number of recipients did not reflect the 
original number of applicants, some of whom did not meet the pay-out requirements to 
receive bonuses. A requirement of the incentive program was for participants—both 
instructional staff and administrators—to complete specific professional development 
courses. According to a report by the U.S. Department of Education (2007), a total of 
$257,754 was spent on various professional development courses designed to target the 
instructional needs of low-performing students and were paid for by the TIF grant. The 
Summative Survey Results Chart in Appendix C revealed that 429 of the 461 (93%) of 
the TIF teachers stated that the TIF professional development courses had a positive 
impact on their classroom instruction. In addition, 420 out of the 461 teachers (91%) 
found the content of the courses to be relevant and 438 (95%) reported using new 
  
45 
 
strategies learned for the course in their classrooms. The overall satisfaction rate on 
professional development indicators was 94% (U.S. Department of Education, 2007).  
 A goal of the TIF grant was to retain highly effective teachers and principals in 
high-needs schools. Information from the TIF Grant Performance Report (see Appendix 
D) noted that at the beginning of the 2007 – 2008 school year, 640 of the 905 (71%) 
teachers in Orange County Public Schools returned to their teaching positions at the ten 
participating TIF schools. However, instructional staff at the TIF schools was reduced by 
14% (129 out of 905 teachers) as a result of severe budget cuts by the Florida Legislature 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2007). The effects of mandatory staff reductions caused 
teacher transfer rates to increase from 3% to 15% and overall teacher retention to drop to 
55% (429 out of 776 teachers). The inability to retain highly qualified teachers may have 
been the result of budget cuts as opposed to a teacher‘s unwillingness to return to their 
schools. On a positive note, at the beginning of the 2007 – 2008 school year, seven of the 
ten (70%) principals returned to their positions at the TIF schools; whereas the following 
school year, the retention rate had improved to eight out of ten (80%) principals (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2007).  
 In the area of academic achievement, 91% (419 of the 461 teachers) surveyed in the 
Summative Survey Results Chart (see Appendix C) believed that their participation in 
TIF would have an impact on their students‘ standardized test scores most likely as a 
result of their targeted professional development courses (U.S. Department of Education, 
2007). For example, on the 2007 FCAT
®
, TIF schools achieved a mean of 32.35 points in 
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mathematics and science. In the overall performance chart in Appendix F, baseline 
achievement in mathematics (M = 46.7) was significantly higher than achievement in 
science (M = 18). During the first year of the TIF grant, the number of students achieving 
at or above grade level increased 4.9 percentage points in mathematics (M = 51.6) and 
5.9percentage points in science (M = 23.9) when compared to the scores of the previous 
year.  
 The Florida Department of Education (2010a) published an Annual State Report 
Card as a part of Florida‘s School Accountability System (see Appendix E). The School 
Accountability System tracked student learning gains based on the state‘s academic 
standards from year to year. The system allowed the improvement of individual students 
to be tracked from one school year to the next based on FCAT
®
 Development Scale 
Scores in reading and mathematics from third through tenth grade (Florida Department of 
Education, 2010a). The Annual State Report Card assigned a school grade as determined 
by the accumulation of percentage points. 
 For 2007, the mean average of the total points on the FCAT
®
 by the ten TIF 
schools was 435.9 (see Appendix F). The baseline of report card points earned by the 
middle schools (M = 453.4) was significantly higher than that of the high schools (M = 
395) by nearly 60 points (U.S. Department of Education, 2007). During the first year of 
the TIF grant, eight of the ten participating schools increased their performance on the 
FCAT
®
 by an average of 27.8 points. On the 2008 FCAT
®
, the TIF middle schools 
earned an average of 482 points, while the TIF high schools earned an average of 421 
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points (U.S. Department of Education, 2007). Under Florida‘s accountability system, at 
least 525 points were required for an ―A‖ rating (see Appendix E). In 2008, one of the 
TIF middle schools received an ―A‖ rating for the first time, having earned 534 points 
(U.S. Department of Education).  
 Previous experiences with Florida‘s teacher incentive programs—E-Comp, STAR, 
and MAP—indicated that their failures, in part, were due to a lack of ―buy in‖ from 
classroom teachers (Jacob & Springer, 2008). On the other hand, the Year One TIF 
Summative Survey Results revealed that 417 of the 461 participants (90%) were 
confident that they had a complete understanding of the application process and the 
requirements related to the performance pay program (see Appendix C). Ninety-five 
percent (437 out of 461 teachers) were glad that their school was a part of the incentive 
program, while 91% (419 out of 461) were planning to participate the following year. 
One reason for the supportive responses could have been that 434 of the 461 teachers 
(94%) acknowledged that the TIF program was often referenced during formal and 
informal faculty meetings. Eighty-eight percent, 407 out of 461, of the respondents 
thought that the requirements for receiving the TIF incentive award were fair and 
equitable. 
 On a final note, 428 of the 461 teachers (93%) collaborated in learning teams on a 
regular basis (see Appendix C). These results contrasted the findings in the survey of 
Hillsborough County (FL) teachers conducted by Jacob and Springer (2008), where 56% 
(947 out of 1691 respondents) felt that incentive programs created a competitive 
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atmosphere which destroyed the ―collaborative culture of teaching.‖  Perhaps the 
favorable results of the Orange County program reflected the fact that 423 out of 461 
respondents (92%) of the viewed the incentive program as a significant element of the 
school improvement plan (U.S. Department of Education, 2007).  
Chapter Summary 
 Teacher pay structures have transformed from providing room and board 
supplements during the late 19
th
 century to the single salary schedule used today. 
Education leaders have sought to design a pay scale for teachers that recognized their 
efforts in the classroom and encouraged others to enter the profession. The 1983 federal 
report, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative For Education Reform, concluded that teachers 
who demonstrated superior pedagogic skills and knowledge should receive bonuses. The 
Teacher Incentive Fund, a federal merit-based compensation policy, was designed by 
federal legislators to reward teachers who increased academic achievement among their 
low-performing students. Supporters of this salary reform program hoped that offering 
financial bonuses would attract and retain high-quality effective educators and close the 
achievement gap, especially in high-poverty, high-minority schools. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
AND METHODOLOGY 
  
 This dissertation focused on an investigation of the impact of a Teacher Incentive 
Fund (TIF) grant on low-performing middle school students in one Central Florida school 
district during its second year of implementation. This chapter details the research design 
and methodology used to analyze the FCAT
®
 Math scores. The topics to be discussed in 
this chapter include: the research design, data gathering and sampling procedures, 
instrumentation, the research questions, statistical analysis procedures, and ethical 
considerations. 
Research Design 
 The quantitative data collected for this study were analyzed using two different 
types of research designs. The first research design was a covariance design as the mean 
differences of the student scores were analyzed (Lomax, 2007; Marion, 2004). This 
design consisted of two groups: students whose teachers participated in the Teacher 
Incentive Fund (TIF) and students whose teachers did not participate. The students whose 
teachers participated in TIF were considered a treatment group, while the students whose 
teachers did not participate were considered a control group. In design notation (see 
Table 6), the observations ―O1‖ located below event one were the 2008 FCAT® Math 
scores of students whose teachers participated in TIF (TIF Teachers) and the scores of 
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students whose teachers did not participate (Non-TIF Teachers). The observations ―O2‖ 
located below event three were the 2009 FCAT
®
 Math scores of students whose teachers 
participated in TIF (TIF Teachers) and the scores of teachers who did not participate in 
TIF (Non-TIF Teachers). The ―X‖ located below event two represented the treatment 
(e.g. implementation of the TIF program), while the ―blank space‖ located below event 
two represented the absence of treatment.    
 
Table 6 
Covariance Research Design 
          
EVENT     1   2    3  
TIF Teachers  O1  X  O2 
Non-TIF Teachers O1    O2  
Note. From Marion, 2004. 
 
 The second research design was an ex post facto observational design, which 
described trends that existed in the FCAT
®
 Math scores of the ten Title I middle schools 
in a Central Florida district from 2005 through 2009 (Rodger, 2004). The independent 
variable was used only to classify the Title I middle schools into two groups (Rodger). In 
design notation (see Table 7), one group (TIF Middle Schools) represented the seven 
Title I middle schools in a Central Florida district that participated in TIF, while the next 
group (Non-TIF Middle Schools) represented the three Title I middle schools that were 
not eligible to participate. The observations in the diagram labeled as ―O1‖, ―O2‖, ―O3‖, 
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―O4‖, and ―O5‖ located under events one, two, three, four, and five; respectively, 
represented the FCAT
®
 Math scores over the five-year period. 
 
Table 7 
Ex Post Facto Research Design 
           
EVENT      1   2   3   4   5  
TIF Middle Schools  O1 O2 O3 O4 O5  
Non-TIF Middle Schools O1 O2 O3 O4 O5  
Note. From Marion, 2004. 
 
Data Gathering Procedures 
 The quantitative data collected for this study were examined to determine the 
impact of the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) on increasing academic achievement among 
low-performing students in grades six through eight. The measuring of academic 
achievement for a low-performing student was based on the amount of learning gains 
made by that student from one grade level to the next consecutive grade level (Florida 
Department of Education, 2008). Annual learning gains for low-performing students were 
based on the difference of the Developmental Scale Scores (DSS) for two consecutive 
FCAT
®
 Math exams. A student who met or exceeded the criteria set by the Florida 
Department of Education (2008) achieved at least one year‘s academic growth. The 
guidelines that determined at least one year‘s academic growth varied according to grade 
level.  
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 The 2008 and 2009 FCAT
®
 Math DSS scores were collected from a Central Florida 
middle school—with the consent of the principal and the school district—and were 
compared to the criteria in Table 8 to determine the amount of learning gains achieved.  
The average learning gain for middle school students was calculated by adding together 
the growth definitions for sixth, seventh, and eighth graders, then dividing that sum by 
three.  Therefore, the average learning gain for middle school students collectively is an 
increase of at least 79 points. 
 
Table 8 
One Year‘s Growth Definition (Learning Gains) for FCAT® Math DSS 
 
Grade 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
DSS 164 119 95 78 64 54 48 
Note.  Retained students cannot demonstrate learning gains using DSS. From Florida Department of 
Education, 2007b. 
 
 In addition to the student scores from the one TIF middle school site, FCAT
®
 Math 
test score data from Orange County Public School‘s ten Title I middle schools were 
collected for academic years 2005 through 2009. A list of the Title I middle schools was 
retrieved from Orange County Public School‘s public website along with information 
about the schools eligible to participate in the TIF program (Orange County Public 
Schools, 2009e). The ten Title I middle school FCAT
®
 Math test score averages for the 
past five years were collected from the Florida Department of Education‘s interactive 
public website (Florida Department of Education, 2010b). These scores were analyzed to 
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determine the existence of trends in the data for the two years before TIF (2005 and 
2006), the two years after TIF (2008 and 2009); the year of implementation (2007) served 
as the baseline. 
Data Sampling Procedures 
 The FCAT
®
 Math DSS scores of students enrolled at one of the Title I middle 
schools participating in TIF were an integral component of this study. These scores were 
a convenience sample based on the participation of the math teachers in the incentive 
program at this middle school. The scores of the students were grouped according to 
whether or not their teachers participated in TIF. There were ten math teachers employed 
at this particular middle school all of whom were eligible to participate in the incentive 
program. Of these ten math teachers, seven participated in TIF while three opted not to 
participate. The data were collected and sorted by grade level and math teacher. In order 
to protect the identity of the students, all identifying information was removed, such as 
student names and identification numbers, and replaced with an alphanumeric code.  
 The student database began with 1047 scores. After removing 97 scores of students 
who did not have 2008 FCAT
® 
Math DSS results to pair with 2009 FCAT
® 
Math DSS 
scores, there was a subtotal of 950. Next, students who scored at a FCAT
®
 Level 3 or 
above were excluded. Since there were 460 students who reached this achievement, 
removing them from the database resulted in a final sample size of 490. In order to 
calculate annual learning gains per the Florida Department of Education guidelines, only 
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DSS scores from students who scored at FCAT
® 
Level 1 or Level 2 were analyzed. The 
sample was limited to the scores of low-performing students that had both 2008 and 2009 
FCAT
® 
Math DSS results. For the seven math teachers who participated in TIF, 358 of 
their students met these criteria, whereas for the three math teachers who opted out of 
participating, 132 of their students met these requirements. 
Instrumentation 
 The dependent variable for the covariance research design was the FCAT
® 
Math 
DSS student scores. The student scores were an interval measurement as the distances 
between the points on the scale were equal across the scale (Lomax, 2007). The 
independent variable was the math teachers, who were divided into two groups: teachers 
who participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) and teachers who did not 
participate in the incentive program. Their participation in TIF was the grouping variable.  
The control group, teachers who did not participate in TIF, were coded in the procedure 
using a TIF status = 0. The treatment group, the teachers participating in TIF, were coded 
in the procedure using a TIF status = 1.    
 The dependent variable for the ex post facto descriptive research design was the 
FCAT
® 
Math DSS Title I middle school scores. In a manner similar to the student scores, 
the middle school scores were an interval measurement as well. For this research design, 
no independent variable was manipulated. The scores were grouped according to the 
middle school‘s eligibility to participate in the TIF program.  
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Research Questions 
 To solidify his commitment to education reform, President Obama‘s economic 
stimulus policy, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), 
earmarked over $687 million taxpayer dollars in funding for performance pay initiatives 
(Chait & Miller, 2009a, 2009b). Moreover, the $4.35 billion Race to the Top fund 
provided competitive federal grants that championed school reform policies (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2010). Race to the Top awarded comprehensive state education 
programs that were implementing innovative initiatives that focused on recruiting and 
rewarding effective teachers and administrators in high-needs schools that increased 
academic achievement.  The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) grant, initiated under the 
George W. Bush Administration with continued support of the Obama Administration, 
was designed to improve academic achievement among low-performing students (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2009b, 2010). Therefore, the four research questions of this 
study focused on the standardized test results of academically struggling students in a 
Central Florida school district that was in the second year of a TIF grant:  
1. What differences in learning gains existed, if any, between the 2008 and 2009 
Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test
® 
Math scores among the students of 
math teachers at one urban Central Florida Title I middle school who 
participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund when compared to the students of 
math teachers who did not participate? 
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2. What trends in the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test® Math scores 
from 2005 through 2009 existed, if any, among the Title I middle schools in 
one Central Florida school district that participated in the Teacher Incentive 
Fund? 
3. What trends in the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test® Math scores 
from 2005 through 2009 existed, if any, among the Title I middle schools in 
one Central Florida school district that did not participate in the Teacher 
Incentive Fund? 
4. What trends in the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test® Math scores 
from 2005 through 2009 existed, if any, between the two groups when 
compared to each other? 
Statistical Analysis Procedures 
 An independent-samples t test was conducted to evaluate the hypothesis that 
differences existed between the 2008 and 2009 Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test
® 
Math scores among the students of math teachers at one urban Central Florida Title I 
middle school based on their teachers‘ participation in the Teacher Incentive Fund.  The 
independent-samples t test was the statistical procedure chosen to analyze the 2008 and 
2009 FCAT
® 
Math DSS scores of the students because the two groups of math teachers 
were independent of each other—the scores of their students had no relationship to one 
another—and the scores were assumed to be normally distributed in each of the two 
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groups (Lomax, 2007). Referencing the covariance research design, the scores of the 
students were grouped by math teachers who participated in TIF—the treatment group 
(―TIF Teachers‖) and the teachers who did not participate—the control group (―Non-TIF 
Teachers‖). The mean scores of the treatment group were compared to the control group 
to determine the existence of any differences in the average learning gain based on the 
growth definition. 
 The Development Scale Scores (DSS) from all of ten of the Title I middle schools 
in a Central Florida district were displayed in ten separate line graphs to show any 
changes over time in the scores from the FCAT
® 
Math tests administered from 2005 
through 2009 (Lomax, 2007). In reference to the ex post facto research design, there were 
five observations of the scores where each observation corresponded to the years 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. Trends that existed in the TIF middle schools that 
participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund were compared to trends that existed in the 
TIF middle schools not eligible to participate. The observations from these line graphs 
were the basis for the final conclusions. 
Ethical Considerations 
 The ethical considerations regarding the student data gathered for this study were a 
moderate concern. The student data had all identifying characteristics removed prior to 
analysis. Also, any of the information published in tables within this study had all 
identifying characteristics removed. Written permission for the gathering of all student 
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data used in this study was granted by both the principal of the TIF Title I middle school 
and the research director for a Central Florida public school district. 
Chapter Summary 
 An independent-samples t test was chosen to expose any differences in learning 
gains that existed between the 2008 and 2009 Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test
® 
Math scores among math teachers who participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund when 
compared to math teachers who did not participate. Moreover, the data collected from ten 
Central Florida Title I middle schools were organized into separate line graphs that 
displayed any trends in learning gains over a five-year period. The topics discussed in 
this chapter included: the research design, data gathering and sampling procedures, 
instrumentation, the research questions, statistical analysis procedures, and ethical 
considerations. The results of these procedures will be analyzed to determine the 
academic impact of a Teacher Incentive Fund grant during its second year of 
implementation on low-performing middle school students in a Central Florida school 
district.    
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
RESULTS 
 
The purpose of this dissertation was to determine if any differences in learning 
gains existed between the 2008 and 2009 Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test
®
 
(FCAT
®
) Math scores among the students of math teachers at one urban Central Florida 
Title I middle school who participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) when 
compared to the students of math teachers who did not participate. Furthermore, the study 
analyzed FCAT
®
 Math scores from 2005 through 2009 in one Central Florida school 
district to determine if any trends existed: among the Title I middle schools participating 
in TIF; among the Title I middle schools that did not participate; and between the two 
groups when compared to each other. 
Chapter Four begins with the results of the independent-samples t tests, which 
analyzed the scores of the students from the Title I middle school. The chapter ends with 
observations of the line graphs of the five-year data gathered from the ten Title I middle 
schools. 
Independent-Samples t Test Results 
 An independent-samples t test was conducted to evaluate the hypothesis that 
differences existed between the 2008 and 2009 Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test
® 
Math scores among the students of math teachers at one urban Central Florida Title I 
middle school based on their teachers‘ participation in the Teacher Incentive Fund.  The 
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mean scores of the treatment group (TIF Teachers) and the control group (Non-TIF 
Teachers) were compared for any differences in the amount of learning gains achieved.  
According to the results in Table 9, Levene‘s test for equal variance, a measure of the 
dispersion of a set of data points around their mean value, shows that the homogeneity of 
variance assumption was satisfied (F = 2.003, p = .158).   
 
Table 9 
Independent-Samples t Test: Levene‘s Test for Equality of Variances 
 
 
Levene's Test for 
    
 
Equality of Variances 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Equal Variances F Sig.   t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Assumed 2.003 0.158 
 
1.49 488 0.14 
Not Assumed       1.43 217.04 0.16 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the dispersion of the student data grouped by their math 
teachers‘ participation in the Teacher Incentive Fund.  The graphs of both the treatment 
group (TIF Teachers) and the control group (Non-TIF Teachers) reveal a normal 
distribution of the data sets. 
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Figure 1. Dispersion of Student FCAT
®
 Math Scores 
 
 
 Table 10 shows that students whose math teachers did not participate in TIF were 
defined as a ―0‖ on the control grouping variable (Non-TIF Teachers), and students 
whose math teachers did participate were defined as a ―1‖ on the treatment grouping 
variable (TIF Teachers).  The mean scores of the TIF teachers (M = 100.97, SD = 
198.83) and the non-TIF teachers (M = 131.80, SD = 216.98) were used to calculate the 
mean difference. The mean difference of the test scores, 30.83, was obtained by 
subtracting the mean scores of the TIF teachers from the mean scores of the non-TIF 
teachers (see Table 11).  The 95% confidence interval for the difference in means was 
wide, ranging from -9.96 to 71.61. 
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Table 10 
Independent-Samples t Test: Group Statistics 
 
Grouping 
Group N Mean SD 
Std. Error 
Variable Mean 
0 Non-TIF Teachers 132 131.80 216.98 18.89 
1 TIF Teachers 358 100.97 198.83 10.51 
 
 
Table 11 
Independent-Samples t Test: t-test for Equality of Means 
 
  t-test for Equality of Means 
   
95% Confidence 
Interval 
 
Mean Std. Error of the Difference 
Equal Variances Difference Difference Lower Upper 
Assumed 30.83 20.76 -9.96 71.61 
Not Assumed 30.83 21.61 -11.77 73.42 
 
 
Although, students whose math teachers participated in TIF (M = 101.0, SD = 
198.83) had lower mean scores than students whose math teachers who did not 
participate (M = 131.8, SD = 216.98), the results of the independent-samples t test 
revealed that there was no statistical difference between the two groups based on 
participation in TIF, t(488) = 1.49, p > .05 (see Table 9). The eta squared index indicated 
that less than 1% of the variance of the test score variable was accounted for by whether a 
teacher participated in TIF. 
 As shown in Table 12, when the mean difference of the students was separated by 
individual math teacher, the mean difference of three of the seven math teachers that 
participated in TIF exceeded the average learning gain for middle school students of 79 
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points. The mean scores of each of the math teachers who did not participate exceeded 
the average learning gain for middle school students (see Table 13). 
 
Table 12 
TIF Teacher FCAT
®
 Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
Variable 
2009 TIF Scores  2008 TIF Scores  Mean 
N M SD   N M SD   Difference 
TIF Teacher A 5 1012.8 252.3  5 961.2 405.0  52.6 
TIF Teacher B 89 1628.9 180.4  89 1492.6 229.4  136.3 
TIF Teacher C 78 1461.5 260.5  78 1427.1 200.0  34.4 
TIF Teacher D 52 1448.9 217.9  52 1382.3 203.9  66.6 
TIF Teacher E 45 1654.6 157.0  45 1457.9 210.1  196.7 
TIF Teacher F 47 1786.6 102.2  47 1651.4 102.9  135.2 
TIF Teacher G 42 1431.1 219.7  42 1373.8 236.6  57.3 
Total 358 1558.4 243.3  358 1457.4 230.6  101.0 
 
 
Table 13 
Non-TIF Teacher FCAT
®
 Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
Variable 
2009 non-TIF Scores  2008 non-TIF Scores  Mean 
N M SD   N M SD   Difference 
Non-TIF 
Teacher H 
70 1574.4 295.5  70 1466.3 289.2  108.1 
Non-TIF 
Teacher I 
12 1391.6 226.6  12 1227.4 242.5  164.2 
Non-TIF 
Teacher J 
50 1619.1 170.1  50 1462.0 178.4  157.2 
Total  132 1574.7 254.8  132 1443.0 256.1  131.8 
 
 The grade-level student mean scores, as shown in Tables 14 and 15, show that both 
groups of sixth graders—students whose teachers participated in TIF (M = 49.0) and 
students whose teachers did not participate (M = -63.8) did not make at least one year‘s 
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learning gain (see Table 16). When compared to the 2008 FCAT
®
 Math test, sixth grade 
students whose teachers did not participate in TIF scored lower on the 2009 FCAT
®
 Math 
test. Students in seventh and eighth grades exceeded Florida‘s guidelines for learning 
gains for each grade level; 78 and 64 points, respectively (see Table 16). Seventh grade 
students whose teachers did not participate in TIF (M = 195.5) had a slightly higher score 
than seventh grade students whose teachers participated (M = 189.9). On the other hand, 
eighth graders whose teachers participated in TIF (M = 105.0) demonstrated higher 
learning gains than eighth graders whose teachers did not (M = 82.1).   
 
Table 14 
Grade Level FCAT
®
 Math Mean DSS Scores: TIF Teachers 
 
  2009 TIF Scores   2008 TIF Scores   Mean 
Grade N M SD   N M SD   Difference 
6 176 1437.1 248.6  176 1388.1 229.2  49.0 
7 99 1621.7 171.8  99 1431.8 229.5  189.9 
8 83 1740.1 144.1  83 1635.1 115.5  105.0 
Total 358 1558.4 243.3   358 1457.4 230.6   101.0 
 
Table 15 
Grade Level FCAT
®
 Math Mean DSS Scores: Non-TIF Teachers 
 
  2009 Non-TIF Scores   2008 Non-TIF Scores   Mean 
Grade N M SD   N M SD   Difference 
6 11 1025.1 244.5  11 1088.9 268.2  -63.8 
7 72 1579.4 190  72 1383.9 228.8  195.5 
8 49 1691.2 168.2  49 1609.1 156.1  82.1 
Total 132 1574.7 254.8   132 1442.9 256.1   131.8 
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Table 16 
One Year‘s Growth Definition (Learning Gains) for FCAT® Math DSS 
 
Grade 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
DSS 164 119 95 78 64 54 48 
Note.  Retained students cannot demonstrate learning gains using DSS. From Florida Department of 
Education, 2007b. 
 
Data Tables and Line Graphs Observations 
 The next phase of the study involved analyzing the mean FCAT
®
 Math scores from 
2005 through 2009 of the ten Title I middle schools in this Central Florida school district 
to describe any trends that existed among schools that participated in TIF and those that 
did not. All Developmental Scale Scores (DSS) were retrieved from the Florida 
Department of Education‘s FCAT® interactive website, and information was displayed in 
tables and line graphs for interpretation and comparisons. (Florida Department of 
Education, 2010b). The seven Title I middle schools that participated in TIF were 
analyzed first; then the three Title I middle schools that did not participate were analyzed. 
Observations of the ten Title I middle schools described any trends that existed over the 
five-year period. Next observations of any trends during the two years TIF was 
implemented at the middle schools were documented. Both groups of middle schools 
were assigned an alphanumeric code that distinguished them from their eligibility to 
participate in the TIF grant. 
 In Table 17 and Figure 2, the scores of TIF MS – 01 revealed increased DSS scores 
across all grade levels over the five-year period where eighth grade had the largest point 
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gain of 51 points. Sixth grade scores increased 33 points and seventh grade scores were 
higher by 8 points.  The most notable increase occurred among the sixth graders after the 
second year of the TIF grant, when scores increased 70 points after two years of declines.  
During that same time period, scores decreased in the seventh and eighth grades by 30 
and 25 points, respectively.  Two years after the implementation of TIF, sixth grade (by 
46 points) and eighth grade (by 19 points) scores were higher whereas seventh grade 
scores were lower (by 11 points). 
 
Table 17 
TIF MS – 01: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
  FCAT
®
 Math Mean DSS Scores   Learning Gains 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009   2006 2007 2008 2009 
6 1510 1527 1497 1473 1543  17 -30 -24 70 
7 1674 1696 1693 1712 1682  22 -3 19 -30 
8 1731 1791 1763 1807 1782   60 -28 44 -25 
Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b. 
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Figure 2. TIF MS – 01: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
 In Table 18 and Figure 3, the scores of TIF MS – 02 revealed increased DSS scores 
across all grade levels over the five-year period where eighth grade had the largest gains 
of 69 points. Seventh grade scores were 48 points higher followed by sixth graders whose 
scores increased 45 points. Eighth grade scores increased 44 points after the first year of 
the TIF grant; however, the scores made a slight decrease of just 2 points after the second 
year.  Seventh grade scores were relatively flat after two years in TIF as the mean score 
remained the same in 2007 and 2009.  Sixth grade scores showed no change after the first 
year of TIF, but increased 16 points after the second year.  
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Table 18 
TIF MS – 02: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
  FCAT
®
 Math Mean DSS Scores   Learning Gains 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009   2006 2007 2008 2009 
6 1566 1618 1595 1595 1611  52 -23 0 16 
7 1713 1699 1761 1768 1761  -14 62 7 -7 
8 1802 1810 1829 1873 1871   8 19 44 -2 
Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b. 
 
 
Figure 3. TIF MS – 02: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
 In Table 19 and Figure 4, the scores of TIF MS – 03 revealed increased DSS scores 
across all grade levels over the five-year period. Eighth grade scores had the largest gains 
at 131 points, followed by sixth grade (124 points) and seventh grade (120 points). Two 
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years after the implementation of TIF, sixth grade (85 points) scored the highest learning 
gains with eighth grade scores at 68 points higher.  On the other hand, seventh grade 
scores were slightly lower (1 point) at the end of the second year of TIF.  Sixth grade 
scores showed a steady year-over-year increase during the five-year period with an 
especially steep gain of 55 points after the second year of TIF. 
 
Table 19 
TIF MS – 03: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
  FCAT
®
 Math Mean DSS Scores   Learning Gains 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009   2006 2007 2008 2009 
6 1502 1527 1541 1571 1626  25 14 30 55 
7 1618 1676 1739 1776 1738  58 63 37 -38 
8 1730 1779 1773 1844 1841   49 -6 71 -3 
Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b. 
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Figure 4. TIF MS – 03: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
 In Table 20 and Figure 5, the scores of TIF MS – 04 revealed increased DSS scores 
in sixth and seventh grade scores (10 points and 34 points, respectively) over the five-
year period. However, eighth grade scores decreased 14 points during that same time. 
Two years after TIF, sixth grade scores had the highest gains at 38 points while seventh 
grade increased a modest three points.  Eighth grade scores decreased 23 points, after two 
years in TIF; most notably dropping 45 points at the end of the second year in TIF. 
 
 
 
  
71 
 
Table 20 
TIF MS – 04: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
  FCAT
®
 Math Mean DSS Scores   Learning Gains 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009   2006 2007 2008 2009 
6 1443 1472 1415 1461 1453  29 -57 46 -8 
7 1579 1634 1610 1598 1613  55 -24 -12 15 
8 1704 1701 1713 1735 1690   -3 12 22 -45 
Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b. 
 
 
Figure 5. TIF MS – 04: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
 In Table 21 and Figure 6, the scores of TIF MS – 05 revealed increased DSS scores 
across all grade levels over the five-year period.  Sixth grade scores had the highest 
learning gains with 35 points, while seventh grade (one point) and eighth grade (nine 
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points) scored modest increases. Two years after implementing TIF, sixth grade had the 
most dramatic increase at 126 points.  On the other hand, the scores of the remaining 
grades decreased; seventh grade went down 39 points and eighth grade went down 22 
points during the same period.  The year before the TIF grant, sixth grade scores dropped 
significantly by 107 points, then increased at a steady rate during the two years after the 
incentive program was implemented, with 78 point gains the first year and 48 point gains 
the second year. 
 
Table 21 
TIF MS – 05: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
  FCAT
®
 Math Mean DSS Scores   Learning Gains 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009   2006 2007 2008 2009 
6 1575 1591 1484 1562 1610  16 -107 78 48 
7 1704 1718 1744 1743 1705  14 26 -1 -38 
8 1790 1797 1821 1819 1799   7 24 -2 -20 
Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b. 
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Figure 6. TIF MS – 05: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
 In Table 22 and Figure 7, the scores of TIF MS – 06 revealed increased DSS scores 
in seventh grade (46 points) and eighth grade (35 points) over the five-year period 
whereas sixth grade scores had decreased 40 points. Two years after implementing TIF, 
seventh grade and eighth grade scores were higher by 38 points and 25 points, 
respectively. Sixth grade scores had decreased by 30 points after two years in the TIF 
program.  After the second year of TIF, all grade levels exhibited decreased scores, with 
sixth grade scores having shown the deepest decline at 37 points.  Eighth grade scores 
dropped 26 points, while seventh grade had the smallest decrease at just one point. 
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Table 22 
TIF MS – 06: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
  FCAT
®
 Math Mean DSS Scores   Learning Gains 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009   2006 2007 2008 2009 
6 1578 1586 1568 1575 1538  8 -18 7 -37 
7 1729 1709 1737 1776 1775  -20 28 39 -1 
8 1808 1831 1818 1869 1843   23 -13 51 -26 
Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b. 
 
 
Figure 7. TIF MS – 06: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
 In Table 23 and Figure 8, the scores of TIF MS – 07 revealed increased DSS scores 
in eighth grade (57 points) and sixth grade (7 points) over the five-year period unlike 
seventh grade scores that had decreased 21 points. During the two years of the TIF grant, 
only eighth grade scores illustrated a gain of six points; sixth grade scores decreased 
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slightly by four points, while seventh grade scores dropped 22 points.  After the second 
year of the TIF grant, seventh grade scores declined 65 points. 
 
Table 23 
TIF MS – 07: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
  FCAT
®
 Math Mean DSS Scores   Learning Gains 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009   2006 2007 2008 2009 
6 1532 1506 1543 1536 1539  -26 37 -7 3 
7 1695 1682 1696 1739 1674  -13 14 43 -65 
8 1744 1768 1795 1808 1801   24 27 13 -7 
Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b. 
 
 
Figure 8. TIF MS – 07: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
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 The last three sets of graphic displays were of the data retrieved from the Title I 
middle schools in the Central Florida district that were not eligible to participate in the 
TIF program. In Table 24 and Figure 9, the scores of Non-TIF MS – 08 revealed 
increased DSS scores across all grade levels over the five-year period;  both sixth grade 
(37 points) and eighth grade (38 points) showed growth, whereas seventh grade (76 
points) demonstrated the most dramatic increase of all the grade levels.  Two years after 
the implementation of the TIF program in the district, all grade levels maintained 
increased scores, however, sixth grade (45 points) had the highest scores followed by 
seventh grade (29 points), then eighth grade at six points.  Sixth grade showed the 
greatest increase of all grades after the first year of the TIF grant with learning gains of 
47 points. 
 
Table 24 
Non-TIF MS – 08: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
  FCAT
®
 Math Mean DSS Scores   Learning Gains 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009   2006 2007 2008 2009 
6 1559 1541 1548 1595 1593  -18 7 47 -2 
7 1666 1721 1713 1704 1742  55 -8 -9 38 
8 1761 1784 1793 1828 1799   23 9 35 -29 
Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b. 
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Figure 9. Non-TIF MS – 08: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
 In Table 25 and Figure 10, Non-TIF MS – 09 revealed a modest increase in DSS 
scores in eighth grade (8 points) scores over the five-year period.  On the other hand, both 
seventh grade and sixth grade scores decreased by 41 points and 37 points, respectively.  
However, the two years the TIF grant was implemented elsewhere in the district, there 
were increased scores across all grade levels.  Sixth grade had the highest gains at 37 
points with eighth grade scores improving by 26 points. Seventh grade scores increased a 
slight two points. Seventh grade had the widest fluctuation during that two-year 
timeframe.  The first year after the TIF program, seventh grade scores increased 52 
points, whereas after the second year, their scores decreased by 50 points. 
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Table 25 
Non-TIF MS – 09: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
  FCAT
®
 Math Mean DSS Scores   Learning Gains 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009   2006 2007 2008 2009 
6 1627 1582 1553 1594 1590  -45 -29 41 -4 
7 1773 1728 1730 1782 1732  -45 2 52 -50 
8 1842 1845 1824 1867 1850   3 -21 43 -17 
Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b. 
 
 
Figure 10. Non-TIF MS – 09: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
 In Table 26 and Figure 11, Non-TIF MS – 10 revealed a modest increase in DSS 
scores in seventh grade (seven points) scores over the five-year period as sixth grade and 
eighth grades showed decreased scores by eight points and 20 points, respectively.  
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During the two years TIF was implemented elsewhere in the district, the scores increased 
across all grade levels with seventh grade improving the greatest by 27 points, followed 
by sixth grade with 14 points and eighth grade with nine points. Seventh grade (44 
points) scores showed the largest gains of all grade levels as the TIF grant was 
implemented in the district for the first time during the 2007 – 2008 school year. 
 
Table 26 
Non-TIF MS – 10: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
  FCAT
®
 Math Mean DSS Scores   Learning Gains 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009   2006 2007 2008 2009 
6 1605 1558 1583 1605 1597  -47 25 22 -8 
7 1745 1710 1725 1769 1752  -35 15 44 -17 
8 1854 1816 1825 1821 1834   -38 9 -4 13 
Note. Florida Department of Education, 2010b. 
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Figure 11. Non-TIF MS – 10: 5-year FCAT® Math Mean DSS Scores 
 
 Table 27 and Figure 12 illustrate the average DSS scores of the seven Title I middle 
schools participating in TIF and the three Title I middle schools not eligible to 
participate.  Both groups showed their largest gains (TIF group at 27 points and non-TIF 
at 23 points) after the first year of the TIF grant, yet both registered a small drop in scores 
after the second year.  At the end of the five-year period, the TIF group scores increased 
by a wider margin when compared to the non-TIF group; the TIF schools increased 
overall by 35 points whereas the non-TIF grew by 6 points.  
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Table 27 
TIF v. Non-TIF Middle Schools: 2005 – 2009 FCAT® Math DSS Scores 
 
  FCAT
®
 Math Mean DSS Scores   Learning Gains 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009   2006 2007 2008 2009 
Non-TIF 1744 1729 1730 1757 1750 
 
-15 1 27 -7 
TIF 1670 1687 1688 1711 1705   17 1 23 -6 
 
 
 
Figure 12. TIF v. Non-TIF Middle Schools: 2005 – 2009 FCAT® Math DSS Scores 
 
 
Chapter Summary 
 Independent-samples t tests were conducted to determine if any differences in 
learning gains existed between the 2008 and 2009 FCAT
® 
Math scores among students of 
math teachers a one Central Florida middle school during the second year of a Teacher 
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Incentive Fund (TIF) grant.  The results of these tests determined that there was no 
statistical difference between the Math scores of the teachers who participated in TIF and 
teachers who did not participate.  The mean scores of the treatment group and the control 
group revealed that learning gains were achieved among both groups. The 2005 through 
2009 FCAT
® 
Math scores of ten Title I middle schools were displayed in tables and 
figures after which observations of any trends were described.  The observations of these 
middle schools yielded inconsistent data trends.  The Title I middle schools that 
participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) had shown increased math scores over 
the five-year period as did the middle schools that were not eligible to participate over the 
same period.  At the end of the five-year period, TIF participating scores increased by a 
wider margin when compared to the non-TIF eligible schools. The results of these 
statistical procedures analyzed the academic impact of a TIF grant on middle school 
students who were performing below grade level in this Central Florida school district.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSIONS, 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) was a five-year federal performance pay 
competitive grant program that supplemented the salary of highly effective teachers with 
financial recognition based on their students‘ standardized test scores. Seven Title I 
middle schools in a Central Florida district were eligible to implement TIF during the 
2007 – 2008 school year.  Participating teachers were qualified to receive bonuses based 
on how well their students scored on the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test
® 
(FCAT
®
).   
 This chapter begins with demographic profiles of the urban Title I middle school 
and the ten Title I middle schools and conclusions by this researcher. The chapter 
continues with a discussion of the learning gains of the students of math teachers who 
participated in TIF and the learning gains of the students of math teachers who did not 
participate. In addition, any trends observed in the five-year FCAT
® 
Developmental Scale 
Scores (DSS) among the seven Title I middle schools of the Central Florida school 
district participating in TIF will be discussed; any trends observed among the three Title I 
middle schools that did not participate will be discussed; and any trends observed 
between the two groups when compared to each other will be discussed.  The chapter 
ends with recommendations for additional research on teacher performance pay 
programs. 
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Demographic Profile: Title I Middle School 
 The urban Title I middle school, whose student scores were analyzed in this study 
received an annual state report card grade of ―C‖ at the end of the 2008 – 2009 school 
year based on its 2009 FCAT
®
 scores.  This middle school served nearly 1000 students in 
its Central Florida community for over thirty years. The student population reflected the 
culturally diverse neighborhood of its residents. The ethnicity of the student body was 
comprised of 49% Black, 41% Hispanic, 4% White, 4% Asian/Pacific Islanders, 1% 
Multiracial, and 1% American Indian/Eskimo. Eighty-nine percent of the students were 
eligible for free or reduced price lunch.  The average daily attendance rate was 93% for 
the 2008 – 2009 school year. Student mobility rate was 50% during the 2009 – 2010 
school year. The student demographic information for the profile of this middle school 
was retrieved from its 2009 – 2010 School Improvement Plan (Orange County Public 
Schools, 2010a). 
 The instructional staff included 61 teachers and three administrators with an ethnic 
distribution of 46% Caucasian, 37% African-American, 16% Hispanic and 1% other. 
Twelve percent of the teachers had Master‘s degrees, while the average number of 
teaching experience was 7.8 years (Florida Department of Education, 2009e).  
Demographic Profile: Ten Title I Middle Schools 
 There were a total of 34 middle schools in this Central Florida district; ten of which 
were designated as Title I schools. These schools served about 10,000 of the 36,690 
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students in grades six through eight. As of the 2009 – 2010 school year, between 76% to 
91% of the students attending these schools received free or reduced price lunch; higher 
than the poverty average for this Central Florida district of 58% (Orange County Public 
Schools, 2009f).  
 The beginning teacher‘s salary in this district was $37,000. The district‘s average 
teacher‘s salary was $44,790. Teachers with advanced degrees received a supplement of 
$2605 for a master‘s, $3993 for a specialist, and $5267 for a doctorate (Orange County 
Public Schools, 2010b).  Collectively, these Title I middle schools employed nearly 600 
teachers and administrators of whom 21% held advanced degrees. The district average 
for advanced degrees was 40%.  The average teaching experience in these middle schools 
was 8.3 years whereas the average for the district was 10.9 years (Florida Department of 
Education, 2009e).   
Limitations  
 The school-wide DSS scores analyzed in this study included FCAT
®
 Level 3, 4, 
and 5 students, whereas the analysis of the student DSS scores were limited to FCAT
® 
Level 1s and 2s in order to calculate learning gains. Displaying the school-level data in 
tables and graphs illustrated the existence of any trends among all students over the five-
year time period as opposed to the amount of learning gains achieved among low-
performing students.  The inclusion of upper level students (i.e., demonstrating skills 
and/or knowledge on or above grade level) may have overshadowed the extent of the 
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actual learning gains of the low-performing students, who were the intended targets of the 
Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) program. 
Conclusion 
 The conclusion of this researcher was that the teacher incentive program 
implemented in a Central Florida district had a positive impact on the learning gains of 
low-performing middle school students. As evidenced in this study, students of the math 
teachers who participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) demonstrated at least one 
year‘s academic growth.  These student-level results were similar to the higher learning 
gains found in the research conducted by Springer et al. (2008) on the Teacher 
Advancement Program (TAP), a multi-state performance pay program subsidized by TIF 
grants.  School-based scores reviewed in the TAP study uncovered that the standardized 
test results of schools participating in the performance pay program increased when 
compared to previous years.  Springer et al. did not use the high-stakes standardized 
exams on which the teacher bonuses in the TAP program were based.  The student 
FCAT
®
 Math scores used in this study were retrieved from the same middle school 
database used to calculate the learning gains for TIF bonuses. Based on the finding in this 
study, the TIF program implemented at an urban Central Florida middle school met its 
primary goal to reward highly effective math teachers who participated in the program 
and increased student standardized test scores.  
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 Students of math teachers who did not participate in TIF had learning gains as well 
at the urban middle school.  Unfortunately, they did not receive financial recognition for 
their efforts.  These highly effective teachers should be encouraged to partake in future 
initiatives that recognize their students‘ academic success.   
 According to the statistical evidence presented in this study, there was no 
difference in student scores based on a teacher‘s participation in TIF. On average, test 
scores increased at this middle school for both groups (TIF teachers v. non-TIF teachers) 
during the TIF program, however, upon closer inspection the mean scores of sixth grade 
teachers noted the failure to exceed at least one year‘s growth for both groups. Clearly, a 
comprehensive review of the curriculum and instructional strategies for this grade level 
are warranted to better understand where adjustments should be implemented.   
 The impact of TIF at the ten Title I middle schools was inconsistent.  During the 
two years before introducing the performance pay program in the seven TIF-eligible Title 
I middle schools, 100% of both seventh and eighth graders had higher Developmental 
Scale Scores (DSS); for the sixth graders only three of the seven (43%) middle schools 
had higher DSS scores.  During the same two years, in the three Title I middle schools 
that were not eligible to participate, two schools had lower DSS scores across all grade 
levels.  During the two years after TIF was implemented, the sixth graders in five of the 
seven (71%) TIF-eligible middle schools had higher DSS scores.  The seventh graders in 
two of the seven (29%) schools had higher scores.  Eighth graders fared better as five of 
the seven (71%) schools had higher scores. Observations of the seven middle schools that 
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were eligible to participate in TIF revealed no consistent impact, positive or negative, of 
the incentive program on student test scores. 
 Observations of the three Title I middle schools that were not eligible to participate 
in TIF exposed more definitive trends when compared to the TIF-eligible middle schools.  
Two years after TIF was implemented in the other Title I middle schools, two of the three 
TIF-ineligible Title I middle schools had higher DSS scores across all three grade levels. 
The other ineligible middle schools had higher DSS scores in sixth and seventh grade.  
FCAT
®
 Math scores of the three TIF-ineligible Title I middle schools were higher after 
the incentive program was implemented at the seven TIF-eligible Title I middle schools. 
 The seven Title I middle schools that participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund 
(TIF) had shown increased math scores over the five-year period as did the middle 
schools that were not eligible to participate over the same period.  During four of the five 
years observed, the scores revealed consistent upward trending in data as both groups of 
middle schools had increased mean scores. At the end of the five-year period, TIF 
participating scores increased by a wider margin (35 points) when compared to the non-
TIF eligible schools (6 points).  The higher test scores of both groups may be a reflection 
of the current era of accountability in education as improving the academic needs of low-
performing students drive curricular, instructional, and funding decisions.  These 
observations highlight that teachers who dedicate themselves to demand academic 
excellence for their students in high-needs schools will achieve success regardless of the 
presence of a financial reward system. 
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Discussion 
 Santibañez et al. (2007) and Springer et al. (2008) reported higher scores from 
students whose teachers participated in an incentive program. Moreover, the research of 
Lavy (2002) and Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2008) also documented that student 
test scores increased when teachers were offered performance bonuses. The findings in 
this dissertation support the work of these authors as the test scores of the students whose 
teachers participated in the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) revealed that learning gains had 
occurred.  In addition, this researcher discovered also that teachers at one urban Central 
Florida middle school who chose not to participate in TIF also had increased student test 
scores.  The independent-samples tests noted that while there was no statistical difference 
between the two groups, mean scores had increased among the groups. Participation in 
TIF was not shown to be a statistical factor in whether or not students test scores would 
improved.  Teachers who participated in TIF and had students whose scores increased 
received bonuses and thus were rewarded for their successful efforts. 
 The implementation of TIF at the urban middle school created a climate that 
focused attention on the academic achievement of low-performing students as TIF 
bonuses were based on improved FCAT
®
 Test scores among this particular group.  As a 
result, a teacher‘s day-to-day classroom decisions, e.g. what to teach and how to teach it, 
were based on knowing their students‘ skills and abilities. I believe that using student 
data to drive instruction, improves a teachers ability to help differentiate his/her lessons 
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to maximize diverse student understanding.  When this instructional technique is utilized 
effectively, teachers will achieve higher levels of success for their students.   
 My research has shown that math test scores increased at seven Title I middle 
schools two years after teachers began participating in TIF.  At the three TIF-ineligible 
middle schools, test scores had increased during the two years TIF was implemented at 
the other schools.  These discoveries challenged the literature concerning the large 
number of inexperienced teachers employed in high-needs schools (Aaronson, Barrow, & 
Sander, 2007; Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2006; Podgursky, 2009; 
Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005). The consensus of the authors was that high-needs 
schools had a disproportionate number of inexperienced teachers, which translated into 
smaller learning gains among their students.  Yet, the evidence presented in this study 
countered their conclusions. The data-driven instructional decisions may have attributed 
to the improved test scores among these schools along with the financial support of the 
federal government through educational funding programs that specifically target high-
needs schools.  Part of the requirements of participating in the TIF program was that 
teachers attend professional development which focused on the academic challenges of 
low-performing students.  Quality collaboration with other teachers (as noted in the 
OCPS Year 1 TIF Summative Survey), when combined with data-driven instruction, 
targeted professional development, and additional resources will provide the framework 
of activities needed for improving student learning. 
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 Goodlad (1984) cited that a major reason teachers entered the profession was the 
satisfaction of working with children. Perhaps, the highly effective—albeit 
―inexperienced‖ teachers—were motivated by their individual personal satisfaction and 
dedication to their craft rather than extrinsic financial rewards. 
Policy Development: Race to the Top 
 The U.S. Department of Education‘s Race to the Top provided $4.35 billion dollars 
in competitive grants that supports education reform across four key areas: preparing 
students to succeed in college and the workplace, building data systems for student 
progress and instructional decisions, linking teacher pay to student success, and 
improving lowest performing schools (U.S. Department of Education, 2010).  Florida 
was one of 40 states and the District of Columbia that applied for the grants and was one 
of the sixteen declared as first-round finalists by the U.S. Department of Education.  In 
May, 2010, the phase one winners and their awards were announced: Delaware ($100 
million) and Tennessee ($500 million).  Their funding was scheduled for allocation for 
over a period of four years. Although Florida missed out on the first round of payouts, 
phase two awards are scheduled for announcement in June 2010. U.S. Education 
Secretary Arne Duncan hoped to award between ten to fifteen grants across the country. 
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Policy Implications: Florida‘s Proposed Merit Pay Plan 
 In April of 2010, House bill 7189 and Senate Bill 6 – Education Personnel reached 
the desk of Florida Governor Charlie Crist.  The major items in this education reform bill, 
which would take effect July 1
st
, 2010 if signed into law, would eliminate automatic 
raises based on teaching experience or education degrees earned, require more than 50% 
of a teacher‘s evaluation to be based on student learning gains, create a performance fund 
for instructional personnel and school-based administrators, and would be phased in over 
three years (Florida House of Representatives, 2010). 
 There was significant opposition by teachers and teachers‘ union regarding this 
merit plan.  Many protestors were extremely concerned with linking their salary to their 
student‘s success on an annual test.  The findings in my research should put to rest some 
of their fears.  Learning gains are attainable as evidenced by the increased mean scores of 
the both the student-level and school-based data.  Furthermore, the scores of students 
whose teachers did not participate in TIF increased.  The caveat is that the growth 
definition must remain the same.  A well-designed merit pay program will encourage 
educators to create lessons that respond to their students‘ diverse educational needs. 
Without a doubt in my mind, these highly effective teachers will achieve academic 
greatness. 
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Recommendations 
 The Teacher Incentive Fund was designed to reward highly effective teachers for 
increasing the academic achievement of low-performing students.  Nonetheless, there 
were three out of ten math teachers at one TIF-eligible Title I middle school in particular 
who did not participate in TIF, but their students scored higher than the students of 
teachers who participated. The results presented in this study uncovered that highly 
effective teachers produce academically successful students—their participation in a 
performance pay program notwithstanding.  As a result of these findings, a 
recommendation for further study would be a follow-up questionnaire at the end of the 
school year surveying the highly effective teachers who were eligible to participate in 
TIF, but chose not to participate. What were their reasons for choosing not to participate? 
Was there a perceived barrier for success that discouraged them from participating? Since 
their students showed learning gains, would they participate in the program the following 
year?  Have their attitudes for not participating been altered in any way? Their responses 
to these questions would provide insight for designing an incentive pay program that 
encouraged all teachers to seek rewards for their outstanding classroom efforts. 
 Another recommendation involves surveying the mindset of highly effective 
teachers in high-needs schools. As documented in this study, the teachers at the TIF-
ineligible Title I middle schools had students who demonstrated learning gains, in spite of 
the absence of an incentive program. What motivated these teachers to be successful? 
What is their perception of incentive programs? Would they participate in one, if given 
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the opportunity? Their responses to these questions would complement the body of 
knowledge on performance pay programs. 
 Replicating this study with a larger sample of teacher participants from TIF award 
grantees in other Florida school districts or surveying TIF participating teachers about the 
instructional strategies they implemented would provide additional insight into 
performance pay plans.  This data for this dissertation was limited to math scores; another 
study could focus on the results of another Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test
®
, 
such as reading or science. 
Chapter Summary 
 This study analyzed the impact of a teacher incentive program in a Central Florida 
public school district.  The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) awarded highly effective 
teachers with cash bonuses for increasing the test scores of its low-performing students.  
However, this study also noted that highly effective teachers who chose not to participate 
had students with increased test scores as well. Further, inconsistent trends among the 
Title I middle schools in their five-year scores were observed.  During the two years after 
the incentive program was implemented, Title I middle schools that were eligible to 
participate in TIF experienced lower scores whereas middle schools that were not eligible 
to participate posted higher scores.  
 This chapter included the policy developments on the first phase of winners 
awarded Race to the Top education grants and Florida‘s Merit Pay plan.  U.S. 
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Department of Education Secretary Arne Duncan hoped to provide funding for more 
states as Florida struggled with adopting its own performance pay plan amid a firestorm 
of opposition.  
 This researcher concluded that TIF had a positive impact on the learning gains of 
low-performing students.  The test scores of students whose teachers participated in TIF 
achieved higher learning gains.  Interestingly, students of teachers who chose not to 
participate in TIF had increased learning gains also. Furthermore, high-needs schools that 
were not eligible to participate had higher scores as the incentive program was 
implemented at other middle schools within its district. The outcomes of teachers who 
chose not to participate and schools that were ineligible for the program created an 
opportunity for additional research.  Also, extending the scope of this research to other 
subject areas and to other Florida districts that were recipients of the TIF grant would 
expand the body of knowledge on the impact of teacher incentive programs on low-
performing students.  
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FCAT
®
 ACHIEVEMENT LEVELS 
 
 The Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test
®
 (FCAT
®
) measured student 
performance on selected benchmarks in reading, mathematics, writing, and science that 
were defined by the Sunshine State Standards (SSS). The SSS articulated challenging 
content that Florida students were expected to know and to be able to do. The SSS were 
developed in seven content areas and were adopted by the State Board of Education in 
May 1996. Achievement Levels described the success a student had achieved on the 
Florida SSS tested on the FCAT
®
 Reading, Mathematics, Science, and Writing 
assessments (see Table 24).  
 
Table 28 
Achievement Level Policy Definitions 
 
Level 5 
This student had success with the most challenging content of the SSS. A 
student who scored at Level 5 answered most of the test questions 
correctly, including the most challenging questions. 
Level 4 
This student had success with the challenging content of the SSS. A 
student who scored at Level 4 answered most of the test questions 
correctly, but may have had only some success with questions that 
reflected the most challenging content. 
Level 3 
This student had partial success with the challenging content of the SSS, 
but performance was inconsistent. A student who scored at Level 3 
answered many of the test questions correctly but was generally less 
successful with questions that were the most challenging. 
Level 2 This student had limited success with the challenging content of the SSS. 
Level 1 This student had little success with the challenging content of the SSS. 
Note. From Florida Department of Education, 2008. 
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 Achievement Levels were based on both Developmental Scale Scores and scale 
scores. In Table 25, Achievement Levels ranged from one (lowest) to five (highest) with 
corresponding Developmental Scale Scores that ranged from zero to about 3000 across 
grades three through ten and were reported only for FCAT
®
 SSS Reading and 
Mathematics. Developmental Scale Scores linked two years of student FCAT
®
 data that 
tracked a student‘s progress over time. Students should have received higher scores as 
they moved from grade-to-grade according to their increased achievement. 
Developmental Scale Scores cannot be used to measure learning gains for FCAT
®
 
Science because students were not tested on this subject at each grade level. In Table 26, 
scale scores ranged from 100 (lowest) to 500 (highest) with corresponding Achievement 
Levels of one through five. Scale scores were reported for all FCAT
®
 SSS subjects 
(Florida Department of Education, 2008).  
  
Table 25  FCAT
®
 Mathematics Developmental Scale Scores 
 
Grade Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 
6 770 - 1553 1554 - 1691 1692 - 1859 1860 - 2018 2019 - 2492 
7 958 - 1660 1661 - 1785 1786 - 1938 1939 - 2079 2080 - 2572 
8 1025 - 1732 1733 - 1850 1851 - 1997 1998 - 2091 2092 - 2605 
Note. From Florida Department of Education, 2008. 
 
 
Table 26  FCAT
®
 Mathematics Scale Scores 
 
Grade Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 
6 100 - 282 283 - 314 315 - 353 354 - 390 391 - 500 
7 100 - 274 275 - 305 306 - 343 344 - 378 379 - 500 
8 100 - 279 280 - 309 310 - 346 347 - 370 371 - 500 
Note. From Florida Department of Education, 2008. 
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TEACHER INCENTIVE FUND GRANTEE PROFILES 
 
 
Program Name LEA Award Amount 
Incentive 
Award 
Alaska Teacher and 
Principal Incentive Project 
Chugach School 
District (Rural 
Alaska) 
Yr 1: $1,278,773 
Yr 2: $1,204,256 
Yr 3: $1,046,050 
$2500 - 
$5500 
Amphitheater Unified 
School District Project 
EXCELL! 
Amphitheater 
Unified School 
District (Tucson, 
AZ) 
Yr 1: $4,700,840 
Yr 2: $7,695,147 
up to 
$10,000 
Beggs Independent 
School District System to 
Motivate and Reward 
Teachers (SMART) 
Beggs(OK) 
Independent 
School District 
Yr 1: $507,514   
Yr 2: $463,665 
$1000 - 
$5000 
Chicago Public Schools 
TAP 
Chicago (IL) 
Public Schools 
Yr 1: $131,273   
Yr 2: $4,055,600  
Yr 3: $6,680,488  
$2000 - 
$5000 
Community Training and 
Assistance Center and the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Schools Leadership for 
Educator's Advanced 
Performance 
Community 
Training and 
Assistance Center 
(Charlotte, NC) 
Yr 1: $1,987,589  
Yr 2: $2,906,012 
  up to 
10% of 
salary 
Cumberland County 
Schools Teacher Incentive 
Fund Program 
Cumberland 
County (NC) 
Schools 
Yr 1: $1,174,176  
Yr 2: $655,312 
up to 
$10,000 
Dallas Principal and 
Teacher Incentive Pay 
Program 
Dallas (TX) 
Independent 
School District 
Yr 1: $126,139   
Yr 2: $777,989   
Yr 3: $10,368,036 
$7500 - 
$10,000 
Note. Center for Educator Compensation Reform, 2008.  
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Program Name LEA Award Amount 
Incentive 
Award 
Eagle County School 
District Performance-
Based Compensation 
Program 
Eagle County (CO) 
School District 
Yr 1: $1,562,129 
Yr 2: $1,427,150 
Yr 3: $1,403,227 
up to 
$10,000 
Edward W. Brooke 
Charter School Teacher 
Excellence Incentive 
Project 
Edward W. Brooke 
Charter School 
(Roslindale, MA) 
Yr 1: $295,090  
Yr 2: $228,732 
up to 
$5000 
Fort Lupton Teacher 
Incentive Fund 
Weld County (CO) 
Re-8 School 
District 
Yr 1: $937,040  
Yr 2: $755,482  
Yr 3: $738,049 
$560 - 
$2170 
Guilford County Schools 
Mission Possible 
Guilford County 
(NC) Schools 
Yr 1: $1,790,060 
Yr 2: $1,450,376 
Yr 3: $1,789,997 
$2500 - 
$5000 
Harrison School District 
Two Recognizing 
Engagement in the 
Advancement of Learning 
Harrison School 
District Two (El 
Paso, CO) 
Yr 1: $1,170,393 
Yr 2: $399,529 
$1000 - 
$2000 
Hillsborough County 
Public Schools 
Performance Outcomes 
with Effective Rewards 
Hillsborough 
County Public 
Schools  (Tampa, 
FL) 
Yr 1: $3,088,827  
Yr 2: $4,110,855 
$1,091.96  
Houston Independent 
School District Project 
SMART 
Houston (TX) 
Independent 
School District 
Yr 1: $3,991,330 
Yr 2: $2,994,775 
Yr 3: $2,197,532 
up to 
$3000 
Lynwood Unified School 
District Qwest for Success 
Lynwood (CA) 
Unified School 
District  
Yr 1: $2,288,832  
Yr 2: $2,140,281 
N/A 
Note. N/A – monetary award information not available. 
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Program Name LEA Award Amount 
Incentive 
Award 
Mare Island Technical 
Academy (MIT 
Academy), The New 3's: 
Rigor, Results and 
Rewards 
MIT Academy 
Mare Island 
Technical 
Academy (Vallejo, 
CA) 
Yr 1: $417,428   
Yr 2: $312,658   
Yr 3: $216,107 
N/A 
Memphis City Schools 
Effective Practice 
Incentive Community 
(EPIC) 
Memphis (TN) 
City Schools 
Yr 1: $3,109,944 
Yr 2: $2,196,767 
Yr 3: $2,206,948 
up to 
$7500 
Miami-Dade County 
Public Schools Project 
RISE 
Miami-Dade 
County (FL) Public 
Schools 
Yr 1: $2,691,841  
Yr 2: $3,761,377 
$2500 - 
$3000 
National Charter Schools 
Effective Practice 
Incentive Community 
(EPIC) 
New Leaders for 
New Schools 
(NYC, NY) 
Yr 1: $4,921,435 
Yr 2: $1,866,502 
Yr 3: $3,627,374 
$3000 - 
$4000 
National Institute for 
Excellence in Teaching, 
Teacher Advancement 
Program 
National Institute 
for Excellence in 
Teaching  (New 
Orleans, LA) 
Yr 1: $1,219,957 
Yr 2: $4,047,871 
minimum 
$3000 
Northern New Mexico 
Performance-Based 
Compensation Program 
Northern New 
Mexico Network 
for Rural 
Education 
(NNMNRE) 
(Espanola and 
Taos, NM) 
Yr 1: $571,074   
Yr 2: $1,656,596  
Yr 3: $1,753,600 
$2434 - 
$3651 
Ohio Teacher Incentive 
Fund (OTIF) 
Ohio Department 
of Education 
Yr 1: $5,510,860 
Yr 2: $5,739,063 
Yr 3: $2,944,338 
$2,000  
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Program Name LEA Award Amount 
Incentive 
Award 
Orange County Public 
Schools - Recognizing 
Excellence in 
Achievement and 
Professionalism 
Orange County 
(FL) Public 
Schools 
Yr 1: $6,595,095 
Yr 2: $5,390,282 
up to $4000 
Partnership for Innovation 
in Compensation for 
Charters Schools (PICCS) 
Center for 
Educational 
Innovation - 
Public Education 
Association 
(NYC, NY) 
Yr 1: $1,647,819 
Yr 2: $2,638,847 
up to $5000 
Philadelphia Teacher and 
Principal Incentive Fund 
Project 
School District 
of Philadelphia 
(PA) 
Yr 1: $1,443,017 
Yr 2: $2,048,208 
Yr 3: $3,638,551 
N/A 
Prince Georges County 
Public Schools Financial 
Incentive Rewards for 
Supervisors and Teachers 
Prince Georges 
County (MD) 
Public Schools 
Yr 1: $572,425   
Yr 2: $2,418,297 
$10,000  
Professional 
Compensation System for 
Teachers and Principals 
(ProComp) 
Denver (CO) 
Public Schools 
Yr 1: $5,747,869 
Yr 2: $2,632,380 
Yr 3: $5,588,227 
salary will 
increase as 
much as 
40% during 
25-year 
career 
School of Excellence in 
Education Teacher and 
Principals Awarded for 
Student Achievement 
School of 
Excellence in 
Education (San 
Antonio, TX) 
Yr 1: $684,373   
Yr 2: $711,714 
N/A 
South Carolina Teacher 
Advancement Program 
(TAP) 
Florence County 
School District 
Three (Lake 
City, SC) 
Yr 1: $1,950,250  
Yr 2: $956,259 
$500 - 
$10,000 
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Program Name LEA Award Amount 
Incentive 
Award 
South Carolina Teacher 
Incentive Fund 
South Carolina 
Department of 
Education 
Yr 1: $7,503,051  
Yr 2: $5,965,279 
Yr 3: $7,445,991 
$2000 - 
$5000 
South Dakota Incentive 
Fund 
South Dakota 
Yr 1: $4,762,694 
Yr 2: $4,661,292 
$750 - 
$1500 
University of Texas 
System Teacher Incentive 
Fund Program 
University of 
Texas System 
Yr 1: $1,438,787 
Yr 2: $7,145,714 
$200 - 
$5000 
Washington, DC Effective 
Practice Incentive 
Community 
District of 
Columbia Public 
Schools 
Yr 1: $3,036,837 
Yr 2: $1,159,619 
Yr 3: 2,847,471 
$8,000  
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YEAR 1 TIF SUMMATIVE SURVEY RESULTS 
(N = 461) 
         
Please mark the box that represents your 
current beliefs. 
I 
Strongly 
Agree 
I Agree 
I Am 
Not 
Sure 
I 
Disagree 
I 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Total 
% 
Agree 
Total 
% Not 
Sure 
Total % 
Disagree 
I am confident that I have a complete 
understanding of the requirements and 
processes related to the TIF grant. 
219 198 29 15 0 90% 6% 3% 
The professional development that I took for 
TIF was relevant to the content that I teach. 
195 225 19 22 0 91% 4% 5% 
I have the support necessary to implement 
what I have learned through the TIF 
professional development. 
250 198 13 0 0 97% 3% 0% 
I have used many of the concepts/strategies 
that I learned through the TIF professional 
development in my classroom instruction. 
199 237 12 13 0 95% 3% 3% 
The professional development that I took for 
TIF has had a positive impact on my teaching. 
269 162 19 11 0 93% 4% 2% 
In my school, the TIF initiative is often 
referenced during formal and informal 
meetings of the faculty. 
200 234 16 11 0 94% 3% 2% 
Note. From U.S. Department of Education, 2007.        
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YEAR 1 TIF SUMMATIVE SURVEY RESULTS 
(N = 461) 
         
Please mark the box that represents your 
current beliefs. 
I 
Strongly 
Agree 
I Agree 
I Am 
Not 
Sure 
I 
Disagree 
I 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Total 
% 
Agree 
Total 
% Not 
Sure 
Total % 
Disagree 
I believe that my participation in TIF will have 
impact on the achievement of my students. 
220 199 33 9 0 91% 7% 2% 
TIF is a significant element of our school 
improvement efforts. 
283 140 29 9 0 92% 6% 2% 
I think that the requirements for the receiving 
of the TIF incentive award is fair and 
equitable. 
191 216 43 10 1 88% 9% 2% 
I am happy that our school was chosen to 
participate in TIF. 
303 134 18 6 0 95% 4% 1% 
I am planning to participate in TIF next year. 274 145 42 0 0 91% 9% 0% 
Note. From U.S. Department of Education, 2007.        
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ORANGE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
TEACHER RETENTION BY TIF SCHOOL 
SCHOOL YEARS: 2006-07 & 2007-08  
                 
TIF - 
Participating 
Schools 
Instructional 
Staff 
Retired Dismissed Resigned Transferred Total Turnover 
Teachers 
Retained 
% Retained 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
School A 68 55 0 1 2 2 23 21 3 10 28 34 40 21 59% 38% 
School B 176 139 2 3 8 7 40 30 11 37 61 77 115 62 65% 45% 
School C 66 55 1 2 0 0 16 11 2 8 19 21 47 34 71% 62% 
School D 97 86 2 4 0 2 18 7 2 7 22 20 75 66 77% 77% 
School E 73 69 1 2 0 2 16 18 1 8 18 30 55 39 75% 57% 
School F 67 55 0 2 1 6 16 14 5 9 22 31 45 24 67% 44% 
School G 122 117 3 2 8 5 24 37 3 10 38 54 84 63 69% 54% 
School H 75 61 0 0 5 4 17 11 2 14 24 29 51 32 68% 52% 
School I 83 72 2 1 2 0 10 15 1 8 15 24 68 48 82% 67% 
School J 78 67 1 1 0 2 16 16 1 8 18 27 60 40 77% 60% 
Total 905 776 12 18 26 30 196 180 31 119 265 347 640 429   
As % of 
Total 
Teachers 
    1% 2% 3% 4% 22% 23% 3% 15% 29% 45% 71% 55%   
Note. From U.S. Department of Education,  
2007.             
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ANNUAL STATE REPORT CARD 
 
 The Florida Department of Education (2010a) published an Annual State Report 
Card as a part of Florida‘s School Accountability System. The School Accountability 
System tracked student learning gains based on the state‘s academic standards from year 
to year. The system allowed the improvement of individual students to be tracked from 
one school year to the next based on FCAT
®
 Development Scale Scores in reading and 
mathematics from third through tenth grade (Florida Department of Education, 2010a). 
The Annual State Report Card assigned a school grade as determined by the 
accumulation of percentage points for eight measures of achievement and two additional 
conditions: 
1. One point for each percent of students who scored at or above FCAT® 
Achievement Level 3 in reading. 
2. One point for each percent of students who scored at or above FCAT® 
Achievement Level 3 in mathematics. 
3. One point for each percent of students who scored at or above FCAT® 
Achievement Level 3 in science. 
4. One point for each percent of students who scored at or above 3.5 on the 
FCAT
®
 writing assessment. 
5. One point for each percent of students who made learning gains in reading. 
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6. One point for each percent of students who made learning gains in 
mathematics. 
7. One point for each percent of the lowest performing students who made 
learning gains in reading. 
8. One point for each percent of the lowest performing students who made 
learning gains in mathematics. 
 The points from each of these eight measures of achievement were added together 
and converted into a school grading scale shown in Table 24. 
 
Table 29 
2009 School Grading Scale 
 
Grade Total Points 
A 525 and above 
B 495 – 524 
C 435 – 494 
D 395 – 434 
F Less than 395 
Note. From Florida Department of Education, 2010a. 
 
 The two additional conditions added to the point system were: (1) schools  that 
earned enough total points to earn a grade of ―A‖ must also have tested at least 95% of 
the eligible students; all other letter grade designations were based on a minimum of 90% 
tested and (2) a school with enough points to have earned an ―A‖ must have shown 
learning gains among the low-performing students in both reading and math for the 
current year; a school with enough points to have earned a ―B‖ or ―C‖ must have shown 
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learning gains of the low-performing students in both reading and mathematics for either 
the current or previous year (Florida Department of Education, 2010a). 
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APPENDIX G: 
2007 & 2008 FCAT
®
 MATHEMATICS, 
SCIENCE, AND OVERALL PERFORMANCE 
REPORT FOR OCPS TIF SCHOOLS 
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2007 & 2008 FCAT
®
 MATHEMATICS,  
SCIENCE, AND OVERALL PEROFRMANCE 
 REPORT FOR OCPS TIF SCHOOLS 
 
       
Eligible TIF Schools 
Points for 
Students 
Achieving at or 
Above Grade 
Level in 
Mathematics 
(Level 3 or 
Higher) 
Points for 
Students 
Achieving at 
or Above 
Grade Level 
in Science                          
(Level 3 or 
Higher) 
Total Report 
Card Points 
  2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 
TIF MS – 01  39 39 13 19 422 454 
TIF MS – 02  56 64 28 40 507 534 
TIF MS – 03  48 57 21 30 467 521 
TIF MS – 04  29 35 12 12 403 430 
TIF MS – 05  42 46 21 25 446 484 
TIF MS – 06  58 59 30 40 473 500 
TIF MS – 07  45 44 17 17 456 450 
TIF HS – 01 48 57 11 18 371 421 
TIF HS – 02  54 60 9 21 430 409 
TIF HS – 03  48 55 18 17 384 434 
Middle School Mean Points 
Earned on FCAT® 
45.3 49.1 20.3 26.4 453.4 481.9 
High School Mean Points Earned 
on FCAT® 
50.0 57.3 12.7 18.7 395 421.3 
Total Mean Points Earned on 
FCAT® 
46.7 51.6 18 23.9 435.9 463.7 
Note. From U.S. Department of Education, 2007.   
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